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Virtually everyone in today’s society is the recipient of some kind of 
government benefit, whether in the form of government employment or 
contracts, licenses or permits, or direct monetary or in-kind benefits.1
Notwithstanding the prevalence and importance of government benefits, 
the Supreme Court has apparently taken the position that, when it comes 
to the administration of government benefits, the availability of judicial 
review by an Article III judge is contingent on legislative discretion.   If 
Congress chooses to preclude or limit this fundamental rule of law 
safeguard, the Court has given every indication that it is willing to go 
along.  
The constitutionality of legislative preclusion of judicial review has 
received considerable attention from constitutional and administrative 
law scholars.2  In fact, it is the subject of one of the longest running and 
most contentious debates in the federal courts scholarship.3  Academic 
commentary on the issue varies widely, ranging from the position that 
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1
 We use the term “government benefits” to describe a broad spectrum of 
benefits, including welfare and social security, public employment and 
government contracts, and occupational licenses or building permits.  Their 
common feature is that they are benefits (including in principle relief from costs 
or burdens) that private persons receive from the government.  We have chosen 
the term government benefits carefully to avoid the confusing doctrinal 
connotations of the Article III concept of “public rights.”  See infra notes __ and 
accompanying text (discussing public rights).  Nonetheless, as we use the 
concept of government benefits, these interests would typically be regarded as 
public rights.
2
 See infra notes ___ & accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes __ & accompanying text. 
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Congress can freely preclude Article III review to the position that 
Congress must provide for such review, with other scholars taking 
intermediate positions that allow Congress to preclude judicial review of 
some issues, but not others.  
We join this debate by proposing a new approach: a standards-based 
theory of judicial review.  The standards-based approach supports a 
much broader right to judicial review that would encompass most 
administrative decisions, including decisions concerning government 
benefits.  We are not the first scholars to argue that the Constitution 
requires Article III review of government benefit decisions (or other 
agency action), but the standards-based approach offers a novel and, we 
believe, more coherent and workable approach to these fundamental 
constitutional issues.
Our standards-based theory is based on two fundamental principles.  
First, whenever government officials make decisions involving the 
application of legal standards, the rule of law – and hence the rule of law 
safeguards of due process and judicial review – attach.  Second, with the 
exception of those cases in which the Constitution itself contemplates 
standardless official discretion, legislative delegations of authority to 
government actors must contain legal standards that guide and control 
discretion.  Because the availability of judicial review is tied to the 
existence of standards and standards are in most instances 
constitutionally required, the standards-based approach ensures that 
Article III judicial review of administrative action is broadly available to 
promote agency compliance with the rule of law.  
This article is part of a larger project to rethink the application of 
core rule of law safeguards to government benefits.  In a previous 
article,4 we criticized the Court’s current entitlement approach to 
procedural due process in government benefit cases.  That approach 
leaves essential procedural safeguards, including notice and the right to 
be heard, contingent on legislative discretion.  We argued that the 
current approach is the product of historical misunderstandings and 
doctrinal missteps, and we advanced the standards-based approach to the 
rule of law as a means of bringing coherence to due process doctrine and 
securing due process protections for government benefits.  Judicial 
4
 We have addressed the failures of the Court’s procedural due process 
jurisprudence as it applies to government benefits in a related article.  See Sidney 
A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law: 
Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.107 
(2005).
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review of government benefits, like due process, is plagued by doctrinal 
incoherence that ultimately permits Congress to curtail or dispense with 
this essential rule of law safeguard.  
Our aim is to restore judicial review to its rightful place in ensuring 
the rule of law is followed in the allocation of government benefits.  We 
say “restore” because Marbury v. Madison,5 the seminal opinion 
concerning the rule of law, indicates that Article III review of the 
government benefit decisions of the Executive Branch is constitutionally 
compelled.6  The Court’s seminal pronouncements concerning the rule of 
law were articulated in the context of a government benefit – Marbury’s 
claim to government employment.  
Our analysis proceeds in several steps.  Part I of the article examines 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, which, as 
mentioned, indicates that Article III review of the government benefit 
decisions is constitutionally compelled.   This aspect of Marbury has 
been overlooked by other scholars and by the Supreme Court, which has 
failed to account for it in its preclusion decisions.
Part II analyzes the “public rights” doctrine.  Under current 
interpretations of the public rights doctrine, Congress may freely 
delegate the adjudication of government benefits to an administrative 
agency (or other non-Article III forum) and foreclose judicial review of 
those decisions by Article III judges.7  We reexamine the case law that 
has given rise to this interpretation and reach a different conclusion.  
While the doctrine justifies the first-instance adjudication of facts and 
law by the Executive Branch, it does not, and cannot, justify legislative 
preclusion of judicial review of such decisions.  
Part III examines the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing 
legislative preclusion of judicial review by Article III judges, which 
5
 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6
 Recent scholarship has cast doubt on the historical significance of 
Marbury, suggesting that the case had little influence throughout most of the 
Nineteenth Century, and was “rediscovered” during the Lochner era in order to 
justify judicial activism on behalf of economic rights.  See, e.g, LARRY KRAMER, 
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004).  Whatever the accuracy of these historical accounts, Marbury’s rule of 
law analysis remains foundational for current constitutional doctrine.  More 
fundamentally, the rule of law premises of Marbury have not been drawn into 
question.
7 See infra notes __ & accompanying text. 
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seem to suggest that preclusion in ordinary cases does not violate either 
due process or Article III absent an independent constitutional violation.  
The precise basis and contours of this doctrine, however, remain 
muddled at best. More fundamentally, this result seems to us 
irreconcilable with the rule of law.  Thus, our examination of the case 
law in these areas leads us to the conclusion that the standards-based 
approach offers a superior foundation for analyzing the preclusion of 
review. 
Finally, part IV elaborates on our standards-based approach to 
judicial review and explains how it impacts several issues that arise in 
conjunction with legislative preclusion of review.  We also compare our 
approach to the large and contentious literature on legislative preclusion 
of judicial review.  We identify others who agree with us that Congress 
cannot generally preclude judicial review and argue why our approach is 
preferable to the approach taken by these other commentators.  We end 
Part IV by contrasting two government benefit systems:  the Social 
Security disability system, which is subject to meaningful review by 
Article III courts, and the Veterans Benefit system, which is not.  We 
explain why experience with these two systems supports our contention 
that Article III judicial review is an essential element in the protection of 
rule of law.
I. MARBURY V. MADISON
We begin with the premise that the rule of law, as a matter of 
constitutional principle and sound policy, should apply to government 
benefit decisions.  Decisions concerning government benefits are subject 
to statutory standards in most cases, and under the rule of law those 
standards bind government officials.  Because the constitutional 
functions of due process and separation of powers can and should be 
understood as providing essential safeguards to ensure compliance with 
statutory standards,8 judicial review should apply to benefit decisions.
While the rule of law has various connotations and shades of 
meaning, at bottom it reflects a core requirement of legal regularity 
under which government actors derive their authority from and are 
bound by the law.9 The seminal rule of law decision for American 
constitutional jurisprudence, Marbury v. Madison, articulated and 
applied fundamental rule of law principles in the context of a 
8
 See infra notes ___ & accompanying text.  
9 See generally Richard Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
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government benefit: William Marbury’s claim to a commission as a 
federal Justice of the Peace, which Secretary of State James Madison 
refused to deliver after taking office.10  It follows that the differences 
between government benefits and private rights do not justify their 
exclusion from essential rule of law safeguards.
The Court held that while Marbury was entitled to a writ of 
mandamus to remedy Madison’s wrongful refusal to deliver his 
commission,11 Congress could not constitutionally confer original 
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue the writ.12  The latter 
proposition was the occasion for Marshall’s famous assertion of judicial 
authority to declare legislative acts unconstitutional, but Marshall also 
relied on rule of law principles to conclude that Marbury was entitled to 
a writ of mandamus, which is the part of the opinion that establishes the 
basic rule of law framework for administrative action. 
Chief Justice Marshall supported his conclusion that Marbury was 
entitled to a remedy for Madison’s failure to deliver his commission 
with a negative proof premised on core rule of law principles.13  The first 
10
 The plaintiff, William Marbury, had been appointed under Midnight 
Judge’s Act of 1801, a last-ditch effort by the Federalists (who had lost the last 
election) to ensconce themselves in power by creating and filling new judicial 
and executive offices.  Marbury’s commission had been signed and sealed, but 
John Marshall himself, who at the time was serving as Secretary of State, 
neglected to ensure its delivery before leaving office.  His successor as Secretary 
of State, James Madison, refused to deliver it.  For extended discussions of 
Marby in historical context, see James O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
219 (1992); William Van Allstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
1969 DUKE L. J. 1
11
 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163-73.  As a threshold matter, the Chief Justice 
initially concluded that Marbury’s right to the commission had vested when 
signed and sealed, even though it had not been delivered.  Id. at 155-62.  
Although this conclusion may have been incorrect as a matter of then prevailing 
law (and perhaps tainted by a conflict of interest, insofar as it was Marshall 
himself who had failed to deliver the commission), these questions do not 
undermine the rule of law reasoning that followed.
12 Id. at 173-80.  As we develop later in the article, we believe this 
conclusion was based on a misreading of Article III’s provisions allocating 
original and appellate jurisdiction.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.  
Our disagreement with Chief Justice Marshall on this point does not affect the 
force of the basic rule of law principles he articulated.
13
 Marshall’s decision to strike down the statute conferring original 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus as inconsistent 
with Article III was likewise premised on rule of law principles.  This conclusion 
was based on the premise that Article III’s list of cases within the original 
6 STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
proposition of this proof was that under the rule of law, there is a legal 
remedy for the wrongful denial of a right.14  As Marshall put it, “[t]he 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.”15  The second proposition is that the Constitution established a 
rule of law state, expressed in Marshall’s famous pronouncement that 
ours is a government of laws, not men.16  Marshall then reasoned to a 
contradiction: “It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if 
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”17
This contradiction proved the opposite: that the laws must provide a 
remedy for the wrongful denial of the commission.  Marshall took it as a 
given that the remedy to be provided would be a judicial one, 
presumably because it is “profoundly the province of the judiciary to say 
what the law is.”18
In making these pronouncements, Chief Justice Marshall was not 
troubled in the least by the fact that the right at issue – Marbury’s 
commission – was a governmentally created interest.19  Indeed, at 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is an exclusive one.  See id. at 174-75.  While 
we disagree with this premise, see infra notes ___ and accompanying text, that 
does not refute the rule of law reasoning on which judicial review is based  For 
Chief Justice Marshall, the adoption of a written constitution in which the 
powers of government are limited necessarily implied that the constitution was 
fundamental or superior law.  See id. at 176-77. As such, when courts were 
called upon to resolve cases and controversies, their duty was to apply the 
superior law – i.e., the Constitution.  See id. at 177-80.
14 Id. at 163.  Marshall supported this premise by reference to Blackstone’s 
statement that “‘where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit 
or action at law whenever that right is invaded.’” Id. (quoting Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, Volume 3, at 23).
15 Id.
16 Id. (quoted supra text at note ___).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 177.  Although Marshall made this latter point in connection with 
his discussion of judicial review of legislation, see infra notes ___ and 
accompanying text, it would seem to be equally applicable to judicial review of 
executive action.  Under the United States constitutional system, the judiciary 
bears the final responsibility for determining the legality of governmental action, 
and for this reason we regard judicial review as an essential rule of law 
safeguard.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.  In other constitutional 
systems, alternative mechanisms for ensuring the legality of government action 
might be fully consistent with the rule of law.
19
 He simply assumed that “if [Marbury] has been appointed, the law 
continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to the possession of 
those evidences of office, which, being completed, became his property.” 5 U.S. 
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various points in the opinion Marshall cited other examples involving 
government benefits, including veterans’ pensions20 and patents for 
public land,21 as obvious cases in which the rule of law required a 
remedy for wrongful government action.  
Nor did it trouble Marshall that the right was being asserted against 
the government, insofar as he rejected any exception from a writ of 
mandamus based on Madison’s high office.22  More directly, in an often-
overlooked passage, Marshall rejected any suggestion that sovereign 
immunity would prevent legal remedies against government officials 
who act in violation of their legal duties.23
Likewise, we see no reason why decisions about government 
benefits should be any less protected by the rule of law than 
governmental decisions affecting private property.  The violation of the 
rule of law is no less when the government fails to follow statutory 
standards in the determination of government benefits than when it 
commits the same sin in decisions that adversely affect private property.  
While there are differences between private property and government 
(1 Cranch) at 155; see also id. at 162 (“To withhold his commission, therefore, is 
an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal 
right.”).  While Marshall spoke of the “evidences” of office as the property in 
question, this was merely a convenient fiction.  It is clear from his treatment of 
the issue in other contexts that the underlying right to serve in the office was at 
issue.  See id. at 173 (concluding that there is no alternative legal remedy so as to 
render mandamus inappropriate because “[t]he value of a public office not to be 
sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the office 
itself, or nothing.”).
20 See id at 164:
By the act concerning invalids, passed in June 1794, the secretary at war is 
directed to place on the pension list all persons whose names are contained in a 
report previously made by him to congress.  If he should refuse to do so, would 
the veteran be without a remedy?  Is it to be contended that where the law in 
precise terms directs the performance of an act in which an individual is 
interested, the law is incapable of securing obedience to its mandate?
21 See id. at 171 (citing the failure “to record a commission, or a patent for 
land” as examples of cases in which “it is not perceived on what ground the 
courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment, that 
right to be done an injured individual, than if the same services were to be 
performed by a person not the head of a department.”)  While land may be 
viewed as traditional private property, a patent for land is a government benefit 
in the sense that the government creates an individual interest in formerly public 
lands.
22 Id. at 169-73.  
23 Id. at 165.  
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benefits that might justify a greater level of substantive protection for the 
creation and retention of private wealth,24 the injury to rule of law 
principles is the same regardless of the character of the underlying 
interest.  
In sum, the rule of law principles articulated in Marbury, including 
the right of judicial review of executive action for compliance with the 
law, were articulated in the context of a government benefit case and 
must be regarded as fully applicable to government benefits.  Marbury 
does not recognize either the governmental creation of these interests or 
their assertion as rights against the government as having any 
implications for the rule of law.25  This makes sense because the 
government’s failure to comply with statutory standards is a violation of 
the rule of law whether it involves government benefits or private 
property.  
Despite Marbury, however, the Supreme Court and many 
commentators have generally assumed that judicial review of the factual 
and legal basis for ordinary government benefit claims may be statutorily 
precluded.  One basis for this assumption is the public rights doctrine, 
which we consider in the following section.
II. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE
The “public rights” doctrine figures prominently in cases analyzing 
whether administrative adjudication infringes on judicial power in 
violation of Article III.  Under modern case law, as we will develop,26
public rights encompass all forms of government benefits.  Although the 
cases discussing the doctrine involve only the propriety of first instance 
administrative adjudication, the Court’s broad pronouncements imply 
that Congress may assign adjudication of public rights to administrative 
agencies with no judicial review.  As we demonstrate in this part of the 
Article, however, the public rights doctrine, properly understood, is 
simply irrelevant to the question of judicial review.  
A.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
24
 For an elaboration of this point, see Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___, at    
145-46.
25
 As we take up in Part II, the Court has sometimes premised its “public 
rights” doctrine on the government’s sovereign immunity, which is understood to 
authorize Congress to preclude Article III judicial review of government benefit 
decisions.  
26 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing Granfinanciera).
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The public rights doctrine originated in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken 
Land and Improvement Company,27 a mid-nineteenth century decision, 
in which the Court stated broadly that “there are matters, involving 
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial 
power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial 
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the 
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.”28
With the rise of the administrative state, Murray’s Lessee took on a 
talismanic importance for the reconciliation of administrative 
adjudication with Article III.  The Court has relied on the distinction 
between public and private rights in a series of decisions deciding the 
constitutionality of administrative adjudication.29  These cases have 
raised more questions about the public rights doctrine than they have 
resolved, leaving the doctrine in an incoherent muddle.
1. CROWELL V. BENSON
One of the first landmark cases for modern administrative 
adjudication, Crowell v. Benson,30 upheld the first-instance adjudication 
of a workers compensation claim by an administrative tribunal.  The 
Court began its analysis with the distinction between public and private 
rights, stating in dicta that the “‘mode of determining [public rights] is 
completely within congressional control.’”31 The public rights doctrine 
27
 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
28 Id. at  284.
29
 The public rights doctrine has also been used to uphold the creation of 
“legislative” or “Article I” courts whose judges do not meet Article III 
requirements, such as the Tax Court and the Court of Claims.  See generally
Fallon, supra note __, at 921-23.  For purposes of our analysis, these tribunals 
are no different than administrative agencies performing judicial functions.
30
 285 U.S. 22 (1932). There were a number of cases invoking the doctrine 
between Murray’s Lessee and Crowell, see id. at 50-51 (citing cases), but 
Crowell is usually regarded by both courts and commentators as laying the 
foundations for modern administrative adjudication.
31 Id. at 50 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).  
Bakelite upheld the Court of Claims as a legislative court, identifying such 
claims as falling in the class of cases “arising between the government and 
others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are 
susceptible of it.” Id. Bakelite expressly relied on sovereign immunity, noting 
that
Conspicuous among such matters are claims against the United States. 
These may arise in many ways and may be for money, lands, or other 
things. They all admit of legislative or executive determination, and yet 
from their nature are susceptible of determination by courts; but no 
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was inapplicable in Crowell, however, because the case arose between 
private parties and therefore concerned a matter of private rights.32
The Court nonetheless upheld adjudication of the claim by an 
administrative tribunal, approving its role as an “adjunct” to the courts.33
Critically, and in contrast to the Court’s assumptions regarding public 
rights, under the adjunct theory, the use of agencies to determine private 
rights was permissible only if there was judicial review, which had to be 
de novo as to questions of law and as to questions constitutional or 
jurisdictional fact.34  While the requirements of de novo review have 
faded,35 the basic dichotomy articulated by Crowell continues to 
influence the analysis of administrative adjudication: administrative 
adjudication of public rights is apparently permissible without any 
judicial review, while administrative adjudication of private rights is 
permissible only if the Courts retain sufficient power of review.
2. NORTHERN PIPELINE CO.
The uncertainty of the rationale for public rights was explicitly noted 
in the next major decision invoking the doctrine, Northern Pipeline Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,36 which invalidated provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code conferring on bankruptcy courts broad jurisdiction 
over common law claims involving a debtor’s estate.  In his plurality 
opinion in Northern Pipeline, Justice Brennan distinguished bankruptcy 
court adjudication of common law claims from other accepted categories 
of legislative courts, including those adjudicating of public rights.  
court can have cognizance of them except as Congress makes specific 
provision therefor. Nor do claimants have any right to sue on them 
unless Congress consents; and Congress may attach to its consent such 
conditions as it deems proper, even to requiring that the suits be 
brought in a legislative court specially created to consider them.
Id. at 452.  Congress subsequently proclaimed that the Court of Claims (as well 
as the Patent Court) was an Article III court and the reasoning of Bakelite has 
been drawn into question by the Supreme Court.  See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 
370 U.S. 530, 531, 547-49 (1962).
32
 285 U.S. at 51.
33 Id. at 51-52.  The Court analogized the agency to the use of special 
masters to find facts.
34 See 285 U.S. at 51-61.  The Court then construed the statute to permit 
such review (so as to avoid constitutional difficulty) and approved the trial 
court’s de novo determination that the agency lacked jurisdiction.
35 See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. 
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.2.2. (3d ed. 1999).
36
 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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After quoting from Murray’s Lessee, the plurality opinion noted two 
rationales for the public rights doctrine:
This doctrine may be explained in part by reference to the 
traditional principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes 
that the Government may attach conditions to its consent to be 
sued. . . . But the public-rights doctrine also draws upon the 
principle of separation of powers, and a historical understanding 
that certain prerogatives are reserved to the political Branches of 
Government.37
Justice Brennan found it unnecessary to define public rights with great 
precision because “at a minimum” they only arise when the government 
is a party, which was not the case in the context of the bankruptcy 
adjudication in question.38  Having determined that the bankruptcy 
courts did not fall within the public rights or any other legislative court 
exception to Article III, Justice Brennan ultimately concluded that the 
bankruptcy courts’ broad jurisdiction was unconstitutional because it 
transferred the “essential attributes of judicial power” to non-Article III 
courts.39
3. THOMAS V. UNION CARBIDE
In Thomas v. Union Carbide,40 the Court moved away from a 
categorical distinction between public and private rights.  Thomas is 
significant because it arose between private parties, yet Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority, noted that the right at issue “bears 
many of the characteristics of a public right” because it involved “an 
agency administering a complex regulatory scheme.”41  The right was a 
statutory right of an initial pesticide registrant to be compensated by a 
follow-on registrant, who was permitted to rely on data submitted by the 
initial registrant after paying the initial registrant for use of the data.  If 
the initial and follow-on registrants could not agree on reasonable 
compensation, the statute provided for mandatory and binding 
37 Id. at 67 (citations to Murray’s Lessee and Ex parte Bakelite omitted).
38 Id. at 69.  Justice Brennan’s discussion also indicated that public rights 
arise only with respect to matters that “could have been determined exclusively” 
by the legislative or executive branch.  Id. at 68.  This view of the doctrine is 
quite narrow, and we would agree with it insofar as foreclosure of judicial 
review is concerned.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
39 See id. at 84-85.
40
 473 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1985).
41
 473 U.S. at 589.  
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arbitration, with very limited judicial review.  Although the arbitration 
mechanism at issue in Thomas permitted review only for fraud, 
misconduct, or misrepresentation and for constitutional errors, the Court 
upheld this provision because it preserved the “‘appropriate exercise of 
the judicial function.’” 42
In light of the relationship between the statutory scheme and the 
private rights, Justice O’Connor concluded that “Congress, acting for a 
valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under 
Article I, may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely 
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate 
for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III 
judiciary.”43  Based on this language, it is unclear whether the Court 
concluded that the right was a public right or merely that, although it 
was a private right, its public rights features justified administrative 
adjudication.  Critically, however, by reference to the public rights 
doctrine, the Court upheld determination of claims by a non-Article III 
tribunal with only very limited judicial review.44
4. CFTC V. SCHOR
The next case, CFTC v. Schor,45 is more significant than Thomas
because it purported to adopt a new and comprehensive test for 
administrative adjudication.  Schor upheld the adjudication by the CFTC 
of state common law contract claims asserted by the defendant brokerage 
firm in response to the plaintiff customer’s private claims alleging 
violations of the federal commodities laws.46
In analyzing the Article III issue, the opinion articulated and applied 
a three factor test which considers:
the extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial power” 
are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to 
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of 
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III 
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, 
and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the 
42 id. at 592.
43 Id. at 593-94.  
44
 As we will explain further in later portions of this article, review for fraud, 
misconduct, misrepresentation, and constitutional error are insufficient to 
preserve the rule of law.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
45
 478 U.S. 833  (1986).
46
 478 U.S. at 851.
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requirements of Article III.47
Within the context of this test, the majority expressly rejected the 
Marathon plurality’s categorical treatment of the public rights doctrine, 
which became only a factor to be considered within the context of the 
“origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated” component of the 
test. 48
Under the first component of Schor test, the scope of judicial review 
is a critical factor in determining whether the essential attributes of 
judicial power have been reserved to Article III courts.  Thus, unlike the 
cases before it, Schor implies that Article III may require judicial review 
of administrative adjudications involving public rights.  At the same 
time, however, because the origins and importance of the right asserted 
is also a factor, the Schor test apparently continues to accord public 
rights second class status and implies that a narrow scope of review, 
such as that in Thomas, would be constitutional when public rights are 
involved.
Schor’s treatment of the public rights doctrine focused on the 
executive power rationale for administrative adjudication.  Both it and 
Thomas observed that “‘the public rights doctrine reflects simply a 
pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial 
method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclusively determined by 
the Executive and Legislative Branches’, the danger of encroaching on 
the judicial powers’ is less ….’”49 Conversely, neither Schor nor Thomas
mentioned sovereign immunity or congressional consent as a factor.50
47 Id.  The essential attributes factors was itself to be evaluated in light of 
various considerations, including the breadth of jurisdiction vested in the non-
Article III tribunal, the scope of judicial review, and the ancillary judicial powers 
vested in the non-Article III tribunal.  See id. at 851-53.
48 See id. at 853.  (“[T]his Court has rejected any attempt to make 
determinative for Article III purposes the distinction between public and private 
rights . . .”) (citing Thomas).
49 Id. at 853-54 (quoting Thomas at 589 (quoting Marathon at 68)).
50
 Under the Schor test, the scope of judicial review of public rights is only a 
factor in assessing the constitutionality of administrative adjudication of public 
rights.  On the other hand, judicial scrutiny of administrative adjudication of 
public rights would apparently be less “searching” than what appears already to 
be a very loose test for private rights.  See id. at 854.  This point was explicit in 
Thomas, where Justice O’Connor observed that a majority of the Court did not 
“endorse the implication of the private right/public right dichotomy that Article 
III has no force simply because a dispute is between the Government and an 
individual.”  473 U.S. at 586 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 n.20 and 
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5. GRANFINANCIERA
Schor seemed to bring some order to this area by crafting a 
comprehensive, if open-ended, test.  This clarity, however, was short-
lived because of the Court’s decision in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg,51 decided only three years later.  Granfinanciera was a 
Seventh Amendment case challenging the constitutionality of 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate preferential transfer claims 
without a jury.  The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Brennan (who 
also authored the Marathon plurality), expressly incorporated the Article 
III public rights doctrine into its Seventh Amendment analysis.52
Without addressing the availability of judicial review, Justice 
Brennan returned to the more categorical assumption that public rights 
could be freely assigned to administrative adjudication without violating 
the Seventh Amendment or, by extension, Article III.53  The Court then 
further confused existing doctrine by adopting an expanded definition of 
public rights, which would include “‘a seemingly ‘private’ right that is 
so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter 
appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the 
Article III judiciary.’”54
70 n.23).
51
 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
52 Id. at 53: 
Indeed, our decisions point to the conclusion that, if a statutory cause of 
action is legal in nature, the question of whether the Seventh 
Amendment permits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal 
that does not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as 
whether Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication of that cause 
of action to a non-Article III tribunal.  For if a statutory cause of action 
. . . is not a ‘public right’ for Article III purposes, then Congress may 
not assign its adjudication to a specialized non-Article III court . . . . 
And if the action must be tried under the auspices of an Article III 
court, then the Seventh Amendment affords the parties a right to a jury 
trial whenever the cause of action is legal in nature.
53 See id. at 51 (“Congress may devise novel causes of action involving 
public rights free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it assigns their 
adjudication to tribunals without statutory authority to employ juries as 
factfinders.”).
54 Id. at 54 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593-94).  The Court also cited 
Thomas as rejecting the view that “‘a matter of public rights must at a minimum 
arise ‘between the government and others.’’”  Id. (quoting Justice Brennan’s 
Marathon plurality, 458 U.S. at 69, which in turn quoted Ex parte Bakelite, 279 
U.S. at 451).  Even applying the broader definition of public rights, the majority 
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Although Granfinanciera did not attempt to explain the public rights 
doctrine, it seemed to focus on administrative adjudication as execution 
of the law.55  Since the Court anticipated that some rights arising 
between private parties could be the public rights, it is inconsistent with 
the sovereign immunity rationale for public rights on which the Court 
had previously relied.  In any case, the analysis also returns to the 
categorical approach to the public rights doctrine, which – taken together 
with the new, broader definition of public rights – threatens to 
undermine judicial review as a rule of law safeguard for some private 
rights.  Thus, for example, Professors Aman and Mayton caution that 
under Granfinanciera, “almost any private, common-law sort of action 
may be converted by Congress to a matter of public right and thereby 
moved outside the zone of Article III courts.”56
The majority’s reasoning provoked a concurring opinion from 
Justice Scalia, who flatly rejected the expanded definition of public 
rights and emphasized the sovereign immunity rationale from Murray’s 
Lessee.57  After an extensive discussion of Murray’s Lessee, Justice 
Scalia continued:
It is clear that what we meant by public rights were not rights 
important to the public, or rights created by the public, but rights 
of the public – that is, rights pertaining to claims brought by or 
against the United States.  For central to our reasoning was the 
device of waiver of sovereign immunity, as a means of 
converting a subject which, though its resolution involved a 
“judicial act,” could not be brought before the courts, into the 
stuff of an Article III “judicial controversy.”  Waiver of 
sovereign immunity can only be implicated, of course, in suits 
where the government is a party.58
Justice Scalia disagreed not only with the expansion of public rights 
concluded that a fraudulent conveyance action in bankruptcy was not a public 
right and invalidated the adjudication of such claims without a jury.
55 See id. at 51-55.
56 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
122 (1st ed 1993).  
57 See 492 U.S. at 65-71.
58 Id. at 68 (emphasis in original).  As will be developed infra notes ___ and 
accompanying text, we agree with Justice Scalia that public rights refer to rights 
of the public, but not with his conclusion that this understanding implicates 
sovereign immunity.
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doctrine to include some rights between private parties, but also with the 
open-ended analysis of Schor, and he would apparently envision a very 
strict limitation on non-Article III adjudication of private rights between 
parties.59
B.  DOCTRINAL INCOHERENCE
We think that few will disagree with our conclusion that the public 
rights doctrine is a mess.  Several critical questions remain unresolved.  
First, the doctrine’s underlying rationale remains unclear.  Second, it is 
unclear whether the presence of a public right categorically removes the 
case from Article III requirements, or whether it is simply a factor to be 
considered.  Finally, it is unclear the extent to which rights arising 
between private parties may be characterized as public rights and why 
this would be so.  More fundamentally, however, to the extent that the 
doctrine implies that Congress may preclude or sharply limit judicial 
review of administrative decisions, it is inconsistent with Marbury and 
the rule of law.
The cases identify two distinct rationales without clearly articulating 
either.  Traditional accounts of the doctrine emphasize sovereign 
immunity and reason that because Congress need not grant any remedy 
against the government, there can be not objection to the provision of an 
administrative remedy without judicial review.60  Consider, for example, 
the following hornbook explanation of Murray’s Lessee: 
The Court [in Murray’s Lessee] explained that Article III does 
not apply to public rights because of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  Since the federal government may not be sued 
without its consent, a litigant is entitled to sue in federal court
claiming rights created by an act of Congress only if that or 
another law consents to such suit.61
The sovereign immunity rationale is not entirely satisfying for a 
number of reasons.  This sort of greater-includes-the-lesser-power 
inclusion has been rejected in other contexts, such as procedural due 
process, where the greater power to create an entitlement does not 
59 See id. at 69-71.
60See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & RONALD M. 
LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 636  (1998) (“The consensus 
of the commentators is that Congress can deprive the federal courts of the power 
to review some disputes (such as claims for Medicare benefits), but cannot deny 
litigants a federal forum for the assertion of constitutional claims.”).
61 PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note ____ , at 75.
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include the lesser power to specify the procedures attached to its 
termination.62  Even accepting its logic, the argument rests on the faulty 
premise that sovereign immunity would bar any form of judicial remedy 
against the government.  This is simply wrong; under the doctrine of Ex 
Parte Young,63 sovereign immunity does not prevent suits against 
government officials for injunctive relief to prevent illegal conduct.64
Indeed, the sovereign immunity rationale is directly contrary to 
Marbury’s treatment of sovereign immunity.65
The executive power rationale for the public rights doctrine, which 
was emphasized in Northern Pipeline, appears to be on the ascendancy.66
Nonetheless, this rationale remains entirely unexplained.  The Court has 
stated that administrative determinations resembling judicial decisions 
have elements of executive power when public rights are involved,67 but 
never explained why.  Instead, this explanation is entirely circular:  
administrative adjudication of public rights is permissible because such 
determinations are executive in character, and they are executive in 
character because they are public rights.  Characterizing public rights 
decisions as executive, moreover, does not explain why judicial review 
can be foreclosed or sharply limited.  Marbury posits precisely the 
opposite – that there must be a remedy for unlawful executive action.
The underlying confusion about the rationale for the public rights 
doctrine breeds confusion about its application.  This uncertainty affects 
the very definition of public rights.  Granfinanciera’s extension of 
public rights to some congressionally created rights between private 
parties removed the bright line certainty of the traditional understanding 
of Crowell v. Benson and Northern Pipeline that public rights arise only 
when the government is a party.  Interpreted broadly, this definition 
could convert many seemingly private rights – including the workers 
62 See Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___, at 118 (discussing the Court’s 
rejection of this argument).  The Court’s treatment of government benefits in the 
due process context is closely connected to the question of judicial review, 
because procedural due process and judicial review are the two principal rule of 
law safeguards built into the constitutional order.
63
 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
64 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
65 See supra note ___ and accompanying text (discussing often overlooked 
passage in Marbury that rejects sovereign immunity as a bar to a remedy).
66
 Insofar as Granfinanciera’s definition of public rights is inconsistent with 
the sovereign immunity rationale, see infra notes ___ and accompanying text, the 
doctrine must rest on the executive power rationale.
67 See, e.g., Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 910-11 (1991); Granfinanciera, 
492 U.S. at 65-66; Crowell v. Benson  285 U.S. at 50-51.  
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compensation claim in Crowell – into public ones.  The Court has 
offered little guidance concerning how to determine whether a 
congressionally created right between private parties is a public right.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that the Court has definitively 
adopted this expanded concept of public rights.  Insofar as 
Granfinanciera ultimately held that the action in question was a private 
right68 and Thomas, in which this expanded concept originated, was 
ambiguous,69 the Court has never clearly held that a right arising 
between private parties was a public right.  In addition, Granfinanciera
is a Seventh Amendment case and might not be wholly applicable in the 
Article III context.
Another uncertainty surrounding the public rights doctrine is the 
doctrinal significance of characterizing the right at issue as a public 
right.  Starting with the broad language in Murray’s and reinforced by 
the sovereign immunity rationale, the traditional statement of the 
doctrine long assumed that public rights adjudications could be vested 
exclusively in administrative agencies with no judicial involvement.  
This complete exclusion approach is reflected in Crowell, Marathon, 
and Granfinanciera.  Thomas and Schor, on the other hand, treat the 
type of right involved as merely a factor in a larger analysis.  As noted 
previously, the application of this approach might require some judicial 
review of public right determinations, but would apparently permit that 
review to be very sharply limited.
Although the public rights doctrine is rife with doctrinal confusion, 
our more fundamental objection to the doctrine, as currently understood, 
is that it is inconsistent with the rule of law.  Moreover, as we will 
develop in the following section, the current doctrine rests on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Murray’s Lessee.  Once this 
misunderstanding is corrected, a coherent and more constrained public 
rights doctrine comes into view.  This new understanding explains why 
first instance administrative adjudication of public rights is 
constitutionally permissible and it clarifies that the public rights 
doctrine, properly understood, has no bearing on the question of judicial 
review.
68 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
69
 The Court actually stated that although the right arose between private 
parties, it bore many of the characteristics of a public right because it was a 
congressionally created right integral to a comprehensive regulatory regime.  See 
supra notes ___ and accompanying text.  This language actually implies that the 
right was a private right, and Granfinanciera’s misrepresent Thomas insofar as 
the Court suggested that the language in Thomas defined public rights.
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C. RETHINKING PUBLIC RIGHTS
This section will offer an alternative interpretation of the public 
rights doctrine of Murray’s Lessee based on the recognition that the 
“public right” in that case was not a right asserted against the 
government, but rather a right asserted by the government on behalf of 
the public.  This interpretation leads to two critical conclusions.  First, 
the sovereign immunity rationale for the public rights doctrine simply 
makes no sense as a justification for the result in the case.  Second, the 
government’s role is relevant not because it could invoke sovereign 
immunity, but rather because the assertion of public rights by 
government actors is an executive act even when it resembles 
adjudication.  Because it is an executive act, administrative adjudication 
is consistent with Article III.  This rationale, however, says nothing 
about whether judicial review of such action may be foreclosed.
1. THE REAL MURRAY’S LESSEE
Murray’s Lessee is a difficult case with complex facts, convoluted 
arguments and arcane language.  The Court, moreover, failed to explain 
what it meant by the term, “public rights,” leaving readers to infer the 
meaning from its reasoning. This may explain why courts and 
commentators tend to repeat its broad language regarding public rights 
without a careful examination of what the Court was really talking about 
or the significance of this discussion in context.  Unpacking the real 
Murray’s Lessee,70 however, is essential to a true understanding of the 
public rights doctrine.
The case arose as an “action of ejectment” involving a dispute 
between private parties over title to land originally owned by a man 
named Samuel Swartwout.71  Swartwout was a customs collector for the 
United States who had failed to remit to the federal government over $1 
million in customs payments that he collected.72  Congress had 
70
 Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Granfinanciera is a notable judicial 
exception, but as we shall develop, Justice Scalia got Murray’s Lessee only half 
right.  For other academic treatments of Murray’s Lessee, see James E. Pfander, 
Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United 
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 731-40 (2004); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights 
and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to 
Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765 (1986).
71
 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 274.
72 See id.  
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authorized the Treasury Department to audit the accounts of tax 
collectors, subject to judicial review, and to recover any deficiencies by 
issuing a distress warrant against their property.  Pursuant to this 
authority, the government determined a deficiency, seized land owned by 
Swartwout, and sold it in a distress sale to the persons who became the 
defendants in Murray’s Lessee.73  Swartwout, who had disappeared, did 
not seek judicial review of the audit or contest the seizure and sale of his 
property.
Swartwout had also defaulted on debts to private creditors, and one 
of them was the plaintiff in the case.  Swartwout’s creditor sought to 
attach the land purchased by the defendants at the distress sale to satisfy 
the debt.  He made two arguments against the validity of the 
government’s seizure and sale of the Swartwout’s land.  First, he argued 
that distress warrant procedure violated due process, but the Court 
rejected this argument in light of a history of summary execution against 
the property of defaulting tax collectors.74  Second, he argued that the 
distress warrant procedure violated separation of powers.  The origin of 
the public rights doctrine is found in the Court’s resolution of the 
plaintiff’s second argument.
The Court’s analysis of the separation of powers issues began with 
the recognition that there was an inevitable overlap between executive 
and judicial actions, insofar as many executive actions involve the 
determination of facts and the application to them of legal rules.75  The 
Court expressed “little doubt” that the type of audit that the Treasury 
Department undertook could be the subject of judicial power,76 but 
concluded that it could also be resolved by the executive branch.77  The 
Court justified this conclusion on the basis of historical understandings, 
referencing the practices of both federal and state governments in the 
United States as well as those of the British government.78
The plaintiff did not dispute these premises, but rather argued that, 
73 See id. at 274-75
74 See id. at 275-80.   In light of longstanding British, state, and federal 
practices, the Court concluded, while “‘due process of law’ generally implies and 
includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial 
according to some settled course of judicial proceedings,” there are exceptions to 
this rule under which “process, in its nature final, issues against the body, lands, 
and goods of certain public debtors without any such trial.”  Id. at 280.
75 See id. at 280-81.  
76 Id. at 281.
77 See id. at 281-82.
78 See id. at 281-82.
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having made the matter subject to judicial review, Congress could not 
authorize the Executive branch to make the initial audit and 
determination of default.  In other words, the plaintiff’s argument was 
that Congress could not divide responsibility for the matter between the 
executive and judicial branches, but rather was required to vest the 
determination either entirely in the courts or entirely in the executive 
branch.79  The Court introduced the “public rights” concept in response 
to this argument to explain why the matter could be resolved by a 
procedure that employed both the executive and judicial branches.
The Court disputed the premises of the plaintiff’s argument, which 
wrongly assumed “that the entire subject matter is or is not, in every 
mode of presentation, a judicial controversy essentially and in its own 
nature, aside from the will of congress to permit it to be so; and it leaves 
out of view the fact that the United States is a party.”80  It was at this 
point in the analysis that the Court made its oft-repeated pronouncement 
that “there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented 
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and 
which are susceptible to judicial determination, but which Congress may 
or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United 
States, as it may deem proper.”81
Thus, the function of the public rights doctrine in Murray’s Lessee
was to explain why the application of law to fact in the first instance 
could be assigned to an executive agency in the first instance and yet be 
subject to judicial review.  It is based on the recognition that executive 
and judicial functions often overlap because both may involve the 
determination of facts and the application to them of the law.  In light of 
this overlap, Congress has broad discretion concerning the allocation of 
authority between the two branches.  As we shall see, however, this 
discretion does not include the foreclosure of judicial review.
2.  MURRAY’S LESSEE AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The assumption that Congress may foreclose review derives from 
the conventional, sovereign immunity-based understanding of the public 
rights doctrine.  This conventional understanding emerges naturally from 
some of the Court’s language in Murray’s Lessee, but it is wrong.  There 
is language in the opinion emphasizing that the government is a party to 
the dispute.  It is also true that the Court assumed that sovereign 
79 Id. at  282.
80 Id. at 283.
81 Id. at 284.  
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immunity would preclude a remedy against the government in the 
absence of congressional consent.  Nonetheless, even in Murray;s 
Lessee itself, the sovereign immunity rationale for the public rights 
doctrine makes no sense.
To begin with, sovereign immunity simply was not implicated on the 
facts in Murray’s Lessee.  The case involved an action between two 
private parties.   The defendant’s claim derived from the government, 
but resolving the dispute would not require any remedy against the 
government.82  Moreover, Congress did create a judicial remedy for a 
wrongful accounting by the Treasury, although Swartwout had failed to 
pursue it.83  Maybe Congress did not have to create the remedy, but that 
issue was simply not before the Court and any pronouncements about it 
are clearly dicta.
On the facts of Murray’s Lessee, moreover, the argument that 
sovereign immunity would have given Congress the power to preclude 
judicial review of the accounting, seizure, and sale proves either too 
much or too little.  The property seized by the government pursuant to 
the warrant – land owned by Swartwout – was traditional private
property.84  Thus, if sovereign immunity converts the administrative 
attachment and sale of private property into a public right as to which no 
judicial remedy is required, the government can use summary procedures 
to take whatever private property it might choose and leave the owner 
without recourse.  This would surely convert the Takings Clause into a 
hollow shell.85 By similar logic the government could violate any 
82
 If the seizure and sale had been undertaken by a foreign government in its 
own territory, the act of state doctrine would apply to protect the sovereign 
power of the foreign government from review by United States courts. cite  But 
that doctrine does not apply to judicial review of actions by the federal 
government.  
83 See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
84
 A different situation would be presented if the government had only 
attached the actual tax monies Swartwout failed to remit or property that was 
directly traceable to it, but the statute in question permitted the warrant to attach 
to all of a tax collector’s land, see id. at 274, and there was no suggestion in the 
case that Swartwout had purchased the land with tax monies.
85
 In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304, 315-316 & n. 9 (1987), the Court indicated that the Fifth 
Amendment provided a self-executing constitutional remedy for takings 
violations, and rejected the argument that the principle of sovereign immunity 
altered that conclusion.  Nonetheless, Justice Scalia took the opposite view in his 
dissent in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988): "No one would suggest 
that, if Congress had not passed the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1), the 
courts would be able to order disbursements from the Treasury to pay for 
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constitutional right with impunity simply by acting first and declining to 
waive sovereign immunity.  Of course, we doubt that the Court would 
accept this logic, but if Murray’s Lessee is based on sovereign immunity, 
there would not appear to be any basis for drawing a distinction between 
government benefits and private property.86
One might confine the implications of the sovereign immunity 
rationale in Murray’s Lessee by limiting it to the context of a defaulting 
tax collector or similar claims, which present special circumstances that 
might justify the use of summary administrative procedures.  The 
temptations of collecting large sums of money and the potential 
consequences to the public fisc arguably create a special need for speedy 
and effective remedies in the case of a default.  Thus, a tax collector’s 
particular responsibilities arguably justify imposing the acceptance of 
summary procedures as a condition of employment.  These features of 
the case were emphasized in the earlier portions of the Court’s opinion 
in Murray’s Lessee addressing the due process issue.87  Confined in this 
manner, however, the public rights doctrine is quite narrow, and 
certainly would not support its extended application in the modern 
administrative state.
The assumption that because of sovereign immunity Congress can 
preclude judicial review of government benefit claims was also contrary 
to Supreme Court precedent as it stood at the time of Murray’s Lessee.88
In an often unnoticed passage in Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall 
distinguished between sovereign immunity in personal injury actions, as 
to which the common law presumed that the king could do no wrong, 
and injury to property, for which the law “‘furnishes various methods of 
detecting the errors and misconduct of those agents by whom the king 
has been deceived and induced to do a temporary injustice.’”89 Thus, 
Marbury assumes that sovereign immunity does not preclude remedies 
property taken under lawful authority (and subsequently destroyed) without just 
compensation."  See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The 
Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 
Vand. L. Rev. 57, 137-39 (1999) (discussing sovereign immunity constraints on 
recovery for government takings).  A detailed exposition of this fascinating issue 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  It should be evident, however, where we 
would come out. 
86 See supra notes __ & accompanying text.  
87 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
88
 It is also contrary to more recent understandings of sovereign immunity.  
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
89
 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (citing Blackstone, Vol. III. p. 255).
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against government officials who violate the law.90
Even more directly relevant is United States v. Nourse,91 an 1835 
decision involving the very statute at issue in Murray’s Lessee, in which 
Chief Justice Marshall was emphatic that sovereign immunity did not 
bar suits against government officials:
It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws and 
principle, furnished with a department whose appropriate duty it 
is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but 
between the government and individuals; a ministerial officer 
might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process, and levy on 
the person, lands, and chattels of the debtor, any sum he might 
believe to be due, leaving to that debtor no remedy, no appeal to 
the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be 
unjust.  But this anomaly does not exist; this imputation cannot 
be cast upon the legislature of the United States.92
In short, whether sovereign immunity would have precluded review of 
the audit of Swartwout’s accounts and subsequent sale of his property 
was by no means clear at the time of Murray’s Lessee.
3.  EXECUTIVE POWER IN MURRAY’S LESSEE
Ultimately, sovereign immunity does not work as an explanation for 
the public rights doctrine in Murray’s Lessee because that reasoning is 
based on a misreading of what the court meant by public rights.  Public 
rights are not public because they are asserted against the government.   
Public rights are public because they belong to the public.  Because the 
enforcement of rights belonging to the public is an executive function, 
public rights determinations that resemble adjudications can be assigned 
90
 Similarly, in his later discussion of the propriety of a writ of mandamus, 
Marshall indicated that the same remedies were available against government 
officials as against private parties.  See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170:
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under colour 
of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be 
pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the 
ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the 
judgment of the law.  How then can his office exempt him from this 
particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if the case be 
such a case as would, were any other individual the party complained 
of, authorize the process?
91
 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8 (1935).
92 Id. at 28-29.
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to administrative agencies.93  This perspective thus provides a 
foundation for the executive power rationale for public rights.  It also 
means, however, that the doctrine is relevant only to first instance 
adjudication and has no bearing on the question of judicial review.94
The Court in Murray’s Lessee suggested the executive power 
rationale for administrative adjudication at the outset of its separation of 
powers analysis.  The Court noted that while “the auditing of the 
accounts of a receiver of public moneys may be, in an enlarged sense, a 
judicial act, . . .  [s]o are all of those administrative duties the 
performance of which involves inquiry into the existence of facts and the 
application to them of rules of law.”95   The Court then gave examples of 
other executive actions which are judicial in this sense, including calling 
forth the militia pursuant to statute and seeking extradition of prisoners 
pursuant to treaty.96  This surprisingly modern explanation of the overlap 
between executive and judicial power makes clear that the Court’s focus 
is on the characterization of the actions in question, not sovereign 
immunity.
Even more significant is a passage that comes immediately before 
the Court’s famous pronouncement on public rights.  In this passage the 
Court elaborated on how a matter could be subject to both executive and 
judicial cognizance by reviewing “some settled rules”:
Though, generally, both public and private wrongs are redressed 
through judicial action, there are more summary extrajudicial 
remedies for both.  An instance of extra-judicial redress of a 
93 See Craig A. Stern, What’s A Constitution Among Friends – Unbalancing 
Article III, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1043, 1062 (1998) (“What makes a matter one of 
public rights is . . . whether the right is one that falls to the executive to 
determine as a matter of public administration, at least for the time being.”).
94
 In Marbury, for example, the delivery (or nondelivery) of the commission 
in question was an executive act,  but it also involved the application of law to 
fact in the sense that Madison made an initial determination of whether Marbury 
was entitled to the commission.  The propriety of allocating this initial decision 
to the executive branch was not in doubt, but it did not follow that judicial 
review was foreclosed.  To the contrary, it was implicitly required by the rule of 
law.  In the same sense, a determination that a claimant is or is not entitled to a 
particular government benefit may be one that may be assigned initially either to 
the executive branch or the judiciary, but that does not answer the question 
whether, if it assigned to the executive, judicial review may be foreclosed.
95 Id. at 280.  This functional analysis of the overlap between executive and 
judicial action has a surprisingly current ring to it.
96 Id.
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private wrong is, the recapture of goods by their lawful owner; 
of a public wrong, by a private person, is the abatement of a 
public nuisance; and the recovery of public dues by a summary 
process of distress, issued by some public officer authorized by 
law, is an instance of redress of a particular kind of public 
wrong, by the act of the public through its authorized agents.97
We believe that the Court’s reference to “public wrongs” is an often-
overlooked antecedent referent for the concept of “public rights.”  After 
all, a “public wrong” is simply the violation of a “public right” or a right 
belonging to the public.98
Consider, for example, the Court’s use of a public nuisance to 
illustrate a public wrong that may be redressed by the actions of a 
private party.  According to well-established law, a “public nuisance is 
based on an infringement of the rights of the community, must affect an 
interest in common to the general public, and unlike a private nuisance, 
does not necessarily involve ownership or use of land by either party.”99
In other words, a public nuisance violates rights that belong to the 
public.  Governmental enforcement of such rights is properly assigned to 
the executive branch.
Once it is recognized that the concept of public rights in Murray’s 
Lessee referred to the government’s pursuit of extrajudicial remedies to 
protect the public interest, the Court’s discussion of the overlap between 
executive and judicial power comes into sharper focus.  When Congress 
enacts a statute, the public interest served by that statute may be 
enforced by means of the Article III adjudication if Congress provides 
for a private right of action (private enforcement) or for a government 
enforcement action.  Alternatively, Congress can authorize extrajudicial 
remedies that may be privately or publicly enforced.  The enforcement 
by government officials of both judicial and extrajudicial remedies is a 
traditional executive function.  Both kinds of executive action, 
moreover, require that officials make judgments about the facts and the 
application of the law to those facts.  
97 Id. at 283.
98
 This is also Justice Scalia’s understanding of a public right, which he 
nonetheless links with the sovereign immunity rationale for the doctrine.  See 
supra notes ___ and accompanying text.  As we discuss more fully below, if our 
understanding of the meaning of a “public right” is correct, however, it has 
nothing to do with sovereign immunity, as suggested by Justice Scalia.  See infra
notes ___ and accompanying text.
99
 Robert L. Glicksman, A Guide to Kansas Common Law Actions Against 
Industrial Pollution Sources, 33 KAN. L. REV. 62, 643 (1985)
STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
27
- 27 -
This view of the public rights doctrine may provide an explanation 
for the Court’s current view that rights arising between private parties 
may be regarded as “public” rights if they are an integral part of the 
enforcement of a comprehensive regulatory regime.100  The Court has 
never fully explained this expanded concept of public rights, but once it 
is understood that “public rights” refer to rights belonging to the public, 
a coherent rationale emerges.  The key point is that because the initial 
determination of the dispute between private parties is incidental to the 
enforcement of the regulatory regime (i.e., the vindication of public 
rights), it can be described as executive in character even though it 
involves the application of law to fact.101
Critically, the executive power explanation of the public rights 
doctrine explains why first instance administrative decisions resembling 
adjudication are constitutionally permissible, but does not justify the 
foreclosure of judicial review.  The Court in Murray’s Lessee may have 
assumed that sovereign immunity would have barred judicial relief 
absent congressional consent, but as we have seen that assumption was 
unnecessary to the decision and incorrect as a matter of law.  Under 
Marbury, executive action subject to legal standards is subject to judicial 
review for compliance with those standards.  Congressional authority to 
permit the first instance administrative adjudication of rights between 
private parties may well be constrained by other separation of powers 
concerns,102 but it does not threaten the rule of law if administrative 
procedures comply with due process and judicial review is available.  
A proper understanding of the public rights doctrine makes clear that 
the constitutionality of precluding or limiting judicial review of 
administrative decisions should be resolved without regard to whether a 
public right is involved. With this jurisprudential underbrush cleared 
away, it is possible to consider the foreclosure of judicial review from a 
fresh perspective, unclouded by assumptions engendered by the public 
rights doctrine.  We turn to this task in the following section.
100 See note __ & accompanying text. 
101
 This was arguably the case in Thomas, for example, where the rights
arising between private parties were incident to the enforcement of a pesticide 
registration scheme.  See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
102
 Likewise, the Seventh Amendment may apply to such determinations.  
Our view of the public rights doctrine would permit first instance administrative 
adjudication, but the Seventh Amendment might require that a jury trial be 
available at some point.  We will not delve into the question whether such trials 
could be held by administrative adjudicators (or legislative courts).
28 STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
III. FORECLOSURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
  The rule of law suggests two possible constraints on the foreclosure 
of judicial review: due process and Article III.  Ironically, while the due 
process and Article III preclusion cases do not reference each other and 
there has been no authoritative resolution of either issue, the Court has 
ended up in roughly the same place in both areas.  Under current 
doctrine it appears that Congress probably cannot preclude judicial 
review of colorable constitutional claims, but it can preclude judicial 
review of ordinary decisions determining facts and applying statutory 
standards.
A.  DUE PROCESS
Beginning with American School of Magnetic Healing v. 
McAnnulty,103 through the leading case of Johnson v. Robison,104 and 
culminating with a number of more recent decisions, the Supreme Court 
has relied on due process to require review of administrative decisions 
notwithstanding statutory provisions that apparently foreclosed it.  Some 
of these cases employ broad rule of law reasoning that is reminiscent of 
Marbury, but more recent cases focus narrowly on the foreclosure of 
particular constitutional claims.  This has led many commentators to 
assume that due process requires a judicial forum for constitutional 
claims (and the Supreme Court has suggested as much), but that due 
process does not apply to foreclosure of review for ordinary 
administrative decisions.  
The McAnnulty case is an early example of broad rule of law 
reasoning.  The case arose when the Postmaster General determined that 
claims by the School of Magnetic Healing that it could teach its 
customers how to use the power of the mind to cure sickness were 
fraudulent, and stopped delivery of the company’s mail.105  When the 
company challenged this action in court, the Postmaster General argued 
that judicial review of the decision was foreclosed because the statute in 
question authorized such action upon evidence “satisfactory to him.”106
The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that because the Postmaster 
General’s action “was a clear mistake of law as applied to admitted facts 
103
 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
104
 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
105 See 187 U.S. at 95-102 (recounting the facts and proceedings in detail).
106 See Rev. Stat. § 3929 (quoted 187 U.S. at 100 n.1).
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. . . the courts must have power in a proper proceeding to grant relief.”107
“Otherwise,” the Court continued, “the individual is left to the 
absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and 
administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law, and is in 
violation of the rights of the individual. Where the action of such an 
officer is thus unauthorized, he thereby violates the property rights of the 
person whose letters are withheld.”108  Notwithstanding this broad 
language, the Court expressly declined to reach Magnetic Healing’s 
constitutional claim, but rather “construed” the statute to permit 
review.109
McAnnulty takes a broad rule of law-based approach to due process 
and arguably implies that judicial review of the legality of administrative 
action is constitutionally required.  Some subsequent cases, such as 
Leedom v. Kyne,110 seem to endorse a similar approach, at least to the 
extent of requiring review when administrative decisions violate a clear 
statutory provision creating a right.111  These cases are limited, however, 
in important respects.  First, while they require review for obvious 
statutory violations, they seem to assume that review may be foreclosed 
for more run of the mill cases involving the application of law to the 
facts.  McAnnulty, for example, assumed that “the determination by the 
Postmaster General of any material and relevant questions of fact arising 
in the administration of the statutes of Congress relating to his 
department” was conclusive.”112  Second, because they rely on statutory 
107
 187 U.S. at 110.
108 Id. See also id. at 108 (asking rhetorically “Has Congress intrusted the 
administration of these statutes wholly to the discretion of the Postmaster 
General, and to such an extent that his determination is conclusive upon all 
questions arising under those statutes, even though the evidence which is 
adduced before him is wholly uncontradicted, and shows, beyond any room for 
dispute or doubt, that the case, in any view, is beyond the statutes, and not 
covered or provided for by them?”).
109 Id. at  101-02.
110
 358 U.S. 185 (1958).
111 See also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 
667, 680 (characterizing the contention that Congress “intended no review at all 
of substantial constitutional and statutory challenges to the Secretary’s 
administration of Part B of the Medicare program” as “an extreme position”) 
(emphasis added); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 
233 (1968) (construing statute precluding review of selective service 
classification except as a defense to a criminal prosecution so as to permit an 
injunction against a violation of the plain and unequivocal language of other 
provisions of the statute).
112
 187 U.S. at 107; see also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 188-91 
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interpretation to avoid constitutional problems, the cases leave the 
existence of an underlying constitutional right of review unresolved.  
Most of the cases refusing to permit the foreclosure of review focus 
on review of particular constitutional claims.  The leading example of 
this sort of decision is Johnson v. Robison,113 which involved equal 
protection and free exercise challenges to the denial of veteran’s benefits 
to individuals who had been classified as conscientious objectors and 
performed alternative civilian service.  The Court considered (and 
rejected) these claims notwithstanding a statute providing that there was 
to be no judicial review of “any question of law or fact” arising under 
any law administered by the Veteran’s Administration.114  The Court 
reasoned that this provision did not foreclose review of constitutional 
challenges to the statute denying benefits because such challenges arise 
under the Constitution, not under any veterans benefit law.115
Although the Court in Robinson did not discuss the constitutional 
difficulties that might arise from a construction that precluded judicial 
review of constitutional claims, this problem was clearly lurking in the 
background.  In the aftermath of Robison, the Court has frequently 
construed broad statutory language precluding review to permit 
adjudication of constitutional claims.116  In these cases, the Court often 
(distinguishing prior cases recognizing foreclosure of review on the ground that 
in this case the NLRB violated a clear statutory provision granting a right); 
Oesterreich, 393 U.S. at 238-399 (employing similar reasoning).
113
 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
114
 Former 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (quoted id. at 365 n.5) provided that “the 
decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law 
administered by the Veteran’s Administration providing benefits for veterans and 
their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official 
or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any 
such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.”
115
 This distinction was articulated expressly by Justice Brandeis in his 
concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 
77 (1936), which stated that “[w]hen dealing with constitutional rights (as 
distinguished from privileges offered by the government) there must be the 
opportunity of presenting in an appropriate proceeding at some time, to some 
court, every question of law raised.”  More recently, in Dalton v. Specter, 511 
U.S. 462, 471-76 (1994), the Court sharply distinguished between constitutional 
and statutory claims, holding that statutory challenges to military base closure 
decisions were foreclosed under the applicable statute
116 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (construing baring 
review of deportation of aliens to permit review of pure questions of law because 
foreclosure of such review would raised serious constitutional questions as to 
whether the writ of habeas corpus had been unconstitutionally suspended); 
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accepted, at least implicitly, the constitutionality of the statute as applied 
in nonconstitutional cases.117
In light of these decisions, most commentators assume that it would 
violate due process to deny a judicial forum for the resolution of 
constitutional claims, and the Court has often suggested the same in 
dicta.118  By comparison, the Court in recent years has seemed 
increasingly willing to read ambiguous statutes as foreclosing review 
when constitutional claims are not involved, and nothing in the 
reasoning of these cases suggests that there are any constitutional 
problems with reading the statutes in question to foreclose review.119
The Court, for example, articulated a reverse presumption against review 
when prosecutorial inaction is at issue in Heckler v. Chaney.120
Subsequently, in Lincoln v. Vigil,121 the court held that allocation of 
lump-sum appropriations is “committed to agency discretion” and thus 
foreclosed from review under the Administrative Procedure Act.122
B.  ARTICLE III AND THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (construing statute 
precluding review of decisions on applications for immigration amnesty to 
permit a due process challenge to procedures followed); Webster v. Doe, 486 
U.S. 592 (1988) (construing statute barring review of decisions by the Director 
of the CIA to dismiss employees so as to permit review of constitutional claims); 
see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) 
(construing statute vesting review of Medicare reimbursement claims involving 
small amounts to private fiscal intermediaries without judicial review so as to 
permit constitutional and statutory challenges to agency regulations).
117
 In Webster v. Doe, for example, the Court upheld portions of a lower 
court’s decision holding that review of a former CIA’s procedural and statutory 
challenges to his termination was foreclosed.  486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988).
118 See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592-93; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. 
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal 
Courts: A Critical Review and Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 93 (1975) 
(“There exists a due process right to an independent judicial determination of 
constitutional rights . . . .”).
119
 Likewise, one leading administrative law textbook observes that in the 
lower courts “[t]here seems to be a modest trend in favor of finding agency 
decisions committed to agency discretion.”  STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. 
STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND REGULATORY POLICY 1014 (5th ed. 2002) (citing cases).  The authors 
continue, however, that “the trend remains modest and cautious, and judicial 
review is the general rule.”  Id. (citing cases).
120
 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
121
 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
122 Id. at 192 (1993).
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In addition to the due process issues discussed above, the preclusion 
of judicial review also has Article III implications because when 
Congress precludes review, it removes a category of cases “arising 
under” federal law from the cognizance of the federal courts.123  The 
constitutionality of such “jurisdiction stripping” statutes requires an 
interpretation Article III with special reference to Exceptions Clause.  In
this section, we review the debate over Congress’s power to strip the 
federal courts of jurisdiction over certain cases or controversies, and 
offer an alternative interpretation of the Exceptions Clause.
1.  THE JURISDICTION STRIPPING DEBATE
Taken on its face, the language of the Exceptions Clause might 
appear to grant Congress broad discretion to remove cases and 
controversies from the jurisdiction of the federal courts:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases 
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.124
This reading, however, cannot be reconciled with the constitutional role 
that Marbury assigns to the courts.  As a result, the authority of 
Congress to remove cases from the jurisdiction has confounded the 
Court, producing no clear answer, and has given rise to one of the oldest 
and most extensive debates concerning the federal courts.  This debate, 
which includes a famous dispute between Professors Henry Hart and 
Hebert Weschler,125 and which is the subject of substantial attention in 
123
 Congressional restrictions on judicial review can take four different 
forms.  First, Congress might withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction but retain 
federal district court jurisdiction.  Second, it might withdraw federal district 
court jurisdiction, but permits suits in state court that are subject to Supreme 
Court review..  Third, Congress could withdraw all federal jurisdiction but allow 
suits in state courts.  Finally, Congress could bar review in any court.  See HART 
& WECHSLER, supra note __, at 358-380 (distinguishing and discussing these 
situations).  Our focus is on the fourth possibility.  It is an interesting question of 
federalism whether state court review of federal administrative action would
satisfy the rule of law, but we find it unnecessary to address this hypothetical 
possibility.  
124
 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
125 Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the 
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each of the major federal courts casebooks,126 has produced no less than 
four different proposed resolutions.127  The standards-based approach 
offers an attractive alternative to these resolutions.
No less a figure than Justice Story took the position that, under 
Article III, the entire judicial power must vest somewhere in the federal 
courts, a proposition that formed the premise of his argument for 
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee.128  This view draws strength from general separation of powers 
doctrine and the rule of law, insofar as removal of cases from the 
jurisdiction of the courts deprives them of the ability to “say what the 
law is.”  While this position has some supporters,129 it is difficult to 
reconcile with the Exceptions Clause and has never commanded a clear 
majority of the Court.  Currently, a variety of statutory provisions 
exclude at least some categories of Article III cases and controversies 
decisions from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.130
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1362 (1953) (arguing that Congress may not limit jurisdiction so as to destroy 
the essential function of the courts) with Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the 
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (arguing that Congress has the 
authority to decide the extent to which federal courts would be used).     
126 See MICHAEL G. COLLINS, ROBERT N. CLINTON & RICHARD A. 
MATASAR, FEDERAL COURTS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 33-73 (1996); DAVID P. 
CURRIE & HARRY N. WYATT, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 98-113 
(4th Ed. 1990); RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID SHAPIRO, 
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 348-87 
(4th ed 1996); HOWARD P. FINK, LINDA S. MULLENIX, THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. & 
MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 163-91 (1995).
127 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 165-77 (2d ed. 2002) (describing four different approaches taken on 
the issue of jurisdictional stripping).
128
 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 330 (1816) (If, then, it is a duty of congress to 
vest the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial 
power) (emphasis in original).
129 See, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Two Tiered-Structure of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of 
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of 
Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1596; Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional 
Authority to restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 
(1974); Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); see also Lawrence Sager, 
Foreward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 55 (1981) (opposing 
selective withdrawal of jurisdiction).
130 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note ___  at 36-47.
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At the other extreme is the view that Congress has plenary authority 
to create exceptions to the jurisdiction of federal courts whenever it 
chooses.131  The Court appeared to endorse this view in Ex parte 
McCardle,132 which dismissed a constitutional challenge to incarceration 
by Reconstruction era military governments on the ground that Congress 
had repealed the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to consider appeals of 
habeas corpus petitions.  The opinion contains broad language 
suggesting that Congress has unlimited power to strip the federal courts 
of jurisdiction pursuant to the Exceptions Clause.133 Nevertheless, the 
Court was also careful to note that the repeal of the statute did not 
completely prevent the consideration of the matter by the Court because 
an alternative basis for jurisdiction – a petition for writ of certiorari –
remained available.134  The Court has subsequently backed away from  
the broad language of McCardle, most notably in United States v. 
Klein,135 which rejected a congressional effort to strip the courts of 
jurisdiction to decide the effect of a presidential pardon.
Since the broad language of McCardle is inconsistent with 
Marbury’s conception of the judicial function, the Court and most 
commentators have moved to something of an uneasy middle ground.  
Among the intermediate positions are the view that the “essential 
functions” of the judiciary must be preserved136 and the view that 
congressional authority to divest the courts of jurisdiction must be 
exercised in conformity with other constitutional provisions.137 These 
interpretations accept the initial proposition that the Exceptions Clause 
authorizes Congress to remove cases entirely from the jurisdiction of the 
131 See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
895 (1984).
132
 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
133 See id. at 514 (“We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the 
legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the 
power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by 
express words.”).
134 See id. at 515 (“Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the 
repealing act in question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of 
habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not except 
from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 
1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.”).  Later 
that same year the Court exercised that jurisdiction in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 8 
(Wall.) 85 (1869).
135
 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
136
 This was Hart’s view.  See supra note ___.
137 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note ___ at 39-40.
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federal courts, but attempt to identify some external constitutional limits 
on that power. 
2. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCEPTIONS 
CLAUSE
We believe, however, that there is an alternative interpretation of the 
Exceptions Clause that is more consistent with the text of Article III as a 
whole and more consistent with the rule of law.138  In our view, the best 
reading of the Exceptions Clause is that it concerns the allocation of 
cases between the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction, 
and does not authorize Congress to remove cases and controversies 
within the scope of federal jurisdiction from the Article III courts.139
Thus, it provides no authority for the preclusion of review.
Article III vests and defines the judicial power of the United States 
in mandatory terms.  Section 1 provides that the “judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested” in the Supreme Court and lower courts.140
Likewise, Section 2 provides that the “judicial Power shall extend” to 
certain categories of cases and controversies.141  The natural reading of 
this language is that the full extent of the judicial power must be vested 
in the federal courts. This construction would parallel the provisions of 
Articles I and II, both of contain vesting clauses that are generally 
understood to be mandatory. Thus, reading the vesting clause of Article 
III as anything other than mandatory would thus be anomalous and an 
understanding of the Exceptions Clause that permits Congress to 
preclude appellate review of administrative action is at odds with the 
other provisions of Article III.    
138
 We focus on these considerations because the historical material 
concerning the Exceptions Clause is “at best, incomplete.”  Michael L. Wells & 
Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 TULANE L. REV. 75 (1995).  
139 We are not the first to contend the Exceptions Clause addresses the 
allocation of cases between the Supreme Court’s original and appellate 
jurisdictions.  See Dean Alfange, Jr, Marbury v. Madison and Original 
Understandings of Judicial Review: in Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 
SUP. CT. REV. 329, 397 & n.313 (collecting authorities); see also Mark Strasser, 
Taking Exception to Traditional Exceptions Clause Jurisprudence: On 
Congress's Power to Limit the Court's Jurisdiction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 125.  
Contra Akhil R. Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 447 (1989); James E. Pfander, 
Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001). 
140
 U.S. Const. Art III, § 1 (emphasis added).   
141
 U.S. Const. Art III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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The Exceptions Clause is likewise poorly drafted if its purpose was 
to permit Congress to remove cases entirely from the Article III 
judiciary.  The Clause provides: “In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as 
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make.”142   Critically, the Clause is not a qualification 
of the language in Section 1 that vests of the judicial power in the 
federal courts or of the language in section 2 listing the cases and 
controversies within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which would 
be the logical phrasing if its purpose was to permit removal of cases 
from the courts’ authority and jurisdiction.  
Instead, the exceptions language is in a clause allocating the original 
and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  Moreover, since the 
Clause specifies that the original jurisdiction of the Surpeme Court 
“shall” include certain classes of cases and that in all other cases its 
jurisdiction “shall” be appellate, the language carries forward the 
implication that the vesting of jurisdiction is mandatory.  Finally, and 
most fundamentally, the power to make exceptions is phrased not in 
reference to the jurisdiction of federal courts generally, but in reference 
to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.143
Both the context of the Clause and its language make it sensible to 
read the Exceptions Clause as addressing the allocation of cases between 
the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction.  The first 
sentence of the Clause sets forth the classes of cases that, at a minimum, 
must be within the Court’s original jurisdiction and the Exceptions 
Clause permits Congress to add to that jurisdiction by moving cases 
from the Court’s appellate to its original jurisdiction.144
142
 U.S. Const. Art III, § 2, cl. 2.
143
 For this reason, Ron Levin has suggested that the historical purpose of 
the Exceptions Clause was to permit Congress to exempt jury verdicts from de 
novo appellate review.  See Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in 
Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 20 n.118 (1985) (citing The Federalist No. 
81 (Hamilton) and Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court’s Appellate 
Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1962).
144
 Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury justified the inference of 
exclusivity on the basis that this was the only reading that gave any effect to the 
language in question.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174-75. But this assumption is simply 
not true. The Clause makes perfect sense as a minimum requirement of original 
jurisdiction cases that can be enlarged, but not diminished.  We recognize the 
irony of relying heavily on Marbury’s rule of law analysis but ultimately 
rejecting the reading of Article III that provided the basis for the assertion of 
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In contrast to the conventional reading of the Exceptions Clause, the 
allocational interpretation provides a logically coherent account of the 
Clause and its role in Article III as a whole.  The classes of cases listed 
in the first sentence of the Clause are especially important to the federal 
system, and it makes sense to specify that they fall within the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction.145  Likewise, it is reasonable to provide for 
the enlargement of the Court’s original jurisdiction to include other 
cases that Congress considers sufficiently important to warrant the 
exercise of that jurisdiction.  At the same time, this reading of the 
Exceptions Clause does not permit Congress to encroach upon the 
essential functions of the judiciary by excluding cases from the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and thus avoids any contradiction with 
the mandatory language of the Vesting Clause and Article III’s definition 
of the judicial power. 
IV. STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
In this section of the Article we explain our standards-based 
approach to the rule of law and how it applies to judicial review of 
government benefit decisions.  We also explain why we think it is 
superior to both the current doctrine and alternative approaches that have 
been suggested in the judicial review literature.  Finally, we evaluate the 
practical significance of a constitutional mandate that requires Article III 
review of administrative adjudication.  
A. STANDARDS-BASED RULE OF LAW
Our argument for standards-based judicial review is easily 
summarized.  Like Chief Justice Marshall,146 we believe the Constitution 
establishes a rule of law state.  Under the rule of law, government 
officials derive their authority to act from the law and they are bound by 
the law in exercising that authority.  The lynchpin of this rule of law 
framework is the presence of legal standards that guide and constrain 
governmental authority.  Thus, the rule of law ordinarily requires the 
legislature to incorporate standards into statutory delegations of 
power to invalidate legislation as unconstitutional.  Nonetheless, this 
disagreement with Marbury is unrelated to its rule of law reasoning.
145
 Indeed, this would seem consistent with the Court’s recent emphasis on 
the “dignity” of states.  See Federal Maritime Com'n v. South Carolina State 
Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 1874 (2002) (“The preeminent purpose of state 
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their 
status as sovereign entities.”).
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authority.  When legal standards apply to official action and the rule of 
law applies, essential rule of law safeguards should apply, including 
judicial review.  Thus, under the standards-based approach, Congress 
generally cannot preclude judicial review of factual and legal decisions 
concerning government benefits.
As we understand the Constitution, it promotes the rule of law in 
three interrelated ways.  First, Congress must establish statutory 
standards to guide and limit Executive Branch lawmaking.  This 
requirement, which is related to both due process and separation of 
powers, is enforced by the Supreme Court primarily by means of the 
non-delegation doctrine.  Second, when government decisions are 
subject to statutory standards, the Due Process Clause obligates the 
government to give adversely affected persons some type of hearing in 
which they can present factual and legal arguments.  Finally, adversely 
affected persons are entitled to judicial review of the government’s 
decision, both as a matter of due process and separation of powers.
1.  THE REQUIREMENT OF STANDARDS
The model of governmental regularity embodied by the rule of law 
implies a general principle of nonarbitrariness in governmental action.147
This principle in turn implies that governmental action must be 
constrained by standards.  Thus, the rule of law generally requires the 
legislature to incorporate statutory standards to guide and control the 
administration of government benefits.  A standardless statute violates 
the rule of law because it “‘lays down no rules by which its impartial 
execution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented.’”148
A requirement of statutory standards is most closely associated with 
separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrine.  The nondelegation 
is normally thought of as policing the boundary between legislative and 
executive action for purposes of the Vesting Clause of the 
Constitution,149 but it also serves a crucial rule of law function.  
146 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
147
 Shapiro & Levy, supra note  , at __.
148
 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1886) (quoting City of 
Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878)).
149
 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1; see Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 
531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question 
is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency. Article I, § 
1, of the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted ... in a 
Congress of the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers . 
. . .”).  In other words, the formulation of an initial policy decision (i.e., setting 
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Enforcement of the doctrine separates the creation of law from its 
implementation and thereby constrains the action of government 
officials by requiring that those officials act under legally binding 
standards.  In this sense, the requirement of standards under the 
nondelegation doctrine is closely akin to a line of Supreme Court cases, 
such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,150 that suggest standardless administrative 
discretion violates due process.151
We recognize that Congress often establishes vague and ambiguous 
statutory standards to guide and limit Executive Action.  Obviously, it 
may be easier for administrators to comply with broad ambiguous 
standards than with specific ones.   Nonetheless, the presence even of 
general standards whose application is subject to judicial review 
preserves the rule of law.  As explained by the Court:
Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is 
unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe 
detailed rules; it then becomes constitutionally sufficient if 
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency 
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated 
authority. Private rights are protected by access to the courts to 
test the application of the policy in the light of these legislative 
declarations.152
The requirement of standards, however, is not absolute because the 
Constitution itself contemplates that some decisions are vested in the 
political discretion of the other branches.  For example, the political 
question doctrine demarcates a class of decisions that are not subject to 
legal standards and therefore operate outside of the rule of law 
constraints that generally apply to government action.153
standards) is a legislative act, while the exercise of discretion pursuant to 
statutory standards is an executive act.  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n. 
16 (1983) (distinguishing between the legislative character of the legislative veto 
and the executive character Attorney General’s decision which was vetoed 
because “that kind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of 
the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to 
judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke the 
authority entirely,” while the legislative veto “is not so checked”).
150
 118 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1886).
151 See Shapiro & Levy, supra note  , at __ (describing and discussing the 
cases).
152
 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
153 See Shapiro & Levy, supra note  , at __  (describing and discussing the 
standardless discretion and due process).
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2.  RULE OF LAW SAFEGUARDS
The nondelegation doctrine provides the foundation for a rule of law 
state by requiring that legislation must generally contain statutory 
standards.  The Constitution creates then two essential safeguards to 
insure Executive Branch compliance with such standards: due process 
and judicial review.  In our view, when the legislature delegates 
authority pursuant to standards, the rule of law attaches.  And when the 
rule of law attaches so do the essential safeguards of due process and 
judicial review.  We dealt with the due process component of this 
equation in our earlier article;154 the discussion here focuses on judicial 
review.
We believe that the preclusion of judicial review is best understood 
from a separation of powers perspective.  Separation of powers is best 
known for its political function of diffusing governmental authority,155 it 
is also has an important rule of law purpose.156  As discussed previously, 
the separation of the legislative and executive functions makes it 
possible to ascertain and enforce legal constraints on government 
action.157  Like due process, separation of powers incorporates a specific 
mechanism for enforcing the rule of law: judicial review.  
Article III provides for the establishment of a judiciary with 
154
  Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___.
155 See Federalist No. 47 (Hamilton) (“The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or 
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, many justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); Massachusetts Constitution, Pt. 1, 
Art. XXX (“In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department 
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the 
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of 
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or 
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”).
156 See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note __, at  67 (“[A] combination of 
powers is bad because it admits ad hoc law making, not permanent and general 
laws but orders cut for the occasion--all according to the will of whomever holds
combined powers.  Separated powers, on the other hand work to induce 
government within the rule of law.”); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary 
Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORN. L. REV. 
430, 450 (1987) (“A close relation between the rule of law and separation of 
powers is evident in both the liberal and democratic elements of liberal 
democratic theory.”).  
157 See supra notes ___ and accompanying text (discussing the this aspect of 
the nondelegation doctrine.
STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
41
- 41 -
jurisdiction to resolve cases and controversies, vesting the courts with 
authority to oversee legislative and executive compliance with legal 
standards.158  The framers not only established the judiciary as the 
guardians of rule of law, they were careful to protect the independence 
of the judicial branch from the other two branches, mandating that 
Article III judges have life-time tenure and that Congress and the 
President could not reduce the compensation of judges once they had 
been appointed.159
To the extent that current doctrine permits the foreclosure of judicial 
review, the application of this essential rule of law safeguard is 
dependent upon legislative discretion.160  Interpreting Article III to 
permit foreclosure of review puts Congress in the position of 
determining if and when a litigant is entitled to the Article III protections 
of an independent judiciary, which is inconsistent with a constitutional 
structure that mandates separation of powers.  Congress violates the 
separation of powers when it precludes Article III review because this 
choice makes Executive Branch the ultimate authority of determining its 
own compliance with statutory standards.161
Nor can the preclusion of judicial review be justified on the ground 
that Congress is dealing with government benefits as opposed to 
traditional “private property.”162  A government action that violates 
statutory standards is every bit as much a violation of the rule of law 
when it concerns the allocation of government benefits as when it 
concerns private property rights.  In both cases, government agents have 
failed to obey the legal standards that control their actions.  We therefore 
see no distinction between government benefits and private property in 
respect to the application of the rule of law.
Finally, from a separation of powers perspective, judicial review by 
Article III courts cannot be replaced by internal administrative appeals 
or appeals to so-called Article I courts.  Appellate judges in the 
Executive Branch do not have the constitutionally mandated 
independence needed to hold the Executive Branch in check.  We are not 
158
 U.S. Const. Art. III, §2.
159 Id. at  §1.
160 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
161
 In effect, the executive becomes judge in its own cause. See supra notes 
__ & accompanying text. 
162
 As we develop in considerable detail in our due process article, the 
historical significance of this distinction is vastly overstated.  See Shapiro & 
Levy, supra note ___ at 119-26.
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entirely sure what the difference is between an administrative agency 
that adjudicates cases and an Article I court, except the court’s location 
outside of the agency whose adjudications it reviews.  Even if this 
arrangement promotes the independence of Article I courts, they are still 
inconsistent with the constitutional plan for separation of powers.163
Moreover, if something less than article III status were sufficient to 
meet the requirements of the rule of law, it would be necessary to 
determine how much independence is enough.  If life tenure is not 
required, what term of years is sufficient to guarantee independence?  
What bases for removal “for cause” are permissible without 
compromising independence?  Can these judges be independent if their 
salaries are not protected?  These questions are not entirely academic.  
As discussed below, there is evidence that some Article I courts in fact 
lack the necessary separation and independence to supply critical 
scrutiny of agency adjudications.164
3. SCOPE OF REVIEW
The standards-based approach to the rule of law thus suggests that 
administrative determinations involving application of law to facts must 
be subject to judicial review165 and that total preclusion of judicial 
163
 We would note that no commentator that we can find argues that Article I 
review is an adequate constitutional substitute for Article III review, although 
there is a difference of opinion concerning the minimum scope of Article III 
review.  See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.  Unlike most other 
commentators, we would require judicial review of both legal and factual 
decision s made in government benefit decisions.  
164 See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing Article I review of 
disability determinations of the Veterans Administration).
165
 This conclusion can be accommodated with sovereign immunity.  
Marbury certainly implied that sovereign immunity is not a bar to review, and as 
demonstrated in part II, sovereign immunity is not relevant to a proper 
understanding of the public rights doctrine.  Although sovereign immunity is 
clearly in considerable tension with the rule of law, the doctrine has received 
new life in the Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions, see, e.g., Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate 
11th Amendment immunity pursuant to the commerce power and overruling 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706 (1999) (extending sovereign immunity to action against states in state 
courts); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College 
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (same); College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (same); see 
also Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (applying Alden).  
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would repudiate sovereign 
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review in such cases would be a violation of the rule of law.  On the 
other hand, the rule of law would not ordinarily require a trial de novo 
by Article III courts.  Deferential review would be permissible provided 
sufficient scope of review is retained to permit reviewing courts to fulfill 
their rule of law function.  First, courts must retain the power to “say 
what the law is,” at least to the point of correcting violations of the clear 
statutory text or failure to apply correctly statutory standards or factors.  
Second, courts must have the authority to ensure that there is a valid 
factual basis for executive action.  Third, courts must be able to review 
the rationality of the connection between the facts found and the 
statutory basis for action.166
The federal courts must retain jurisdiction to review the factual 
determinations made by executive branch adjudicators, because without 
such authority, the courts are not in a position to ensure compliance with 
the law.  Factual findings can be manipulated to evade legal constraints 
and judicial review could easily be evaded if it did not include review of 
factual determinations as well as legal conclusions.167  This recognition 
is reflected in the text of Article III itself, which provides that the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction extends to both “Law and 
immunity as to federal government.  Nonetheless, sovereign immunity should not 
stand as a complete bar to judicial review, because suits against government 
officials for declaratory and injunctive relief are available under the doctrine of 
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  The Court’s federalism cases emphasize 
that this avenue for the vindication of federal statutory and constitutional rights 
remains available.  See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57. 
While this form of review may not make damages available, if government 
benefits are wrongly withheld courts would presumably be able to require 
administrative officials to comply with the law.  A critical issue might be 
whether a reviewing court must be able to order the disbursement of monetary 
benefits, insofar as the Court has held that federal courts may not order 
retroactive payment of benefits unlawfully withheld by state officials under the 
Eleventh Amendment.  See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  There is, 
however, a critical difference between ordering a state (or the federal 
government) to pay damages for a tortious act and requiring state or federal 
officials to award someone a government benefit for which the person is legally 
entitled and for which a state or Congress has appropriated a money to pay such 
benefits.  
166 See Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the 
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate 
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L. J. 387 (1987) (contending that 
judicial review of an agency’s reasons is constitutionally required).
167 See Allentown Mack Sales and Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 
(“An agency should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed even 
political oversight, by disguising its policymaking as factfinding.”)
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Fact.”168  For this reason, the Supreme Court has at times engaged in de 
novo review of “constitutional facts” that determine the outcome of 
individual rights claims.169  We do not suggest that judicial review of 
agency findings in ordinary cases must be de novo, but the courts must 
retain sufficient review of facts and the application of law to facts to 
preserve the rule of law.
In general terms, current scope of review doctrine under the 
Administrative Procedure Act satisfies these requirements,170 but more 
limited review may violate the rule of law.  In particular, we have doubts 
about the current veteran’s benefit regime, which precludes Article III 
review of factual determinations except as to constitutional facts,171 and 
the limitation of review in Thomas v. Union Carbide to issues of fraud, 
misconduct, or misrepresentation or constitutional error.172
168
 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
169
 In Crowell v. Benson, for example, the Court suggested that there must 
be de novo review of administration decisions respecting both constitutional and 
“jurisdictional” facts, construing the statute in question to permit it.  See supra
note ___ and accompanying text.  Although the jurisdictional fact doctrine has 
fallen into disuse and de novo review of constitutional facts is not consistently 
applied, these doctrines underscore the need for some factual review to prevent 
abuse.  See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumer’s Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) 
(engaging in independent review of trial court’s finding of actual malice to 
support First Amendment defense to product disparagement claim); Norris v. 
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (rejecting state court factual determination that 
African-Americans were not excluded from the jury pool); see generally Henry 
P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985).
170
  5 U.S.C. § 706 permits reviewing courts to set aside agency decisions, 
inter alia, if they are contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, or not supported 
by substantial evidence (in formal adjudications).  Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts may reverse an administrative construction of a 
statute if the construction violates the clear statutory text or is otherwise based 
on an impermissible or unreasonable construction of a statute.  Under either the 
substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious standard of review courts may 
reverse agency decisions that are not supported by an adequate factual basis in 
the record.  The arbitrary and capricious standard of review also requires that the 
agency articulate the connection between the facts found and the choice made, 
and this form of review focuses on the adequacy of the agency’s explanation.  
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983).
171
 In particular, under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (200_), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over 
veterans benefit appeals, “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 
determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of 
a particular case,” except for constitutional claims.
172 See supra notes ___ (discussing limitation of review of arbitral awards 
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Whether statutes limiting review by restricting the timing of review 
or limiting the parties who may seek review present a problem would 
depend on the circumstances.  Except perhaps where delay would lead to 
the permanent loss of an irreplaceable interest, the preclusion statutes 
that affect only the timing of judicial review would not present a serious 
problem.  On the other hand, partial preclusion statutes that prevent 
particular parties from seeking review,173 are problematic if they leave 
those injured by the improper application of legal standards without a 
remedy.
4. FORECLOSURE OF REVIEW AND POLITICAL DISCRETION
Judicial review would be required for most government benefit 
decisions under the foregoing analysis.  The only exception would be 
when the Constitution itself contemplates standardless political 
discretion.  In such cases, the rule of law does not attach and neither 
does the requirement of judicial review.  Indeed, this aspect of the 
standardfs-based approach helps to make sense of prominent cases in 
which the Court has upheld foreclosure of review.
In Heckler v. Chaney,174 for example, the Court held that 
prosecutorial decisions by administrative officials are presumptively 
nonreviewable.  The Court’s analysis of this issue focused on separation 
of powers concerns and emphasized that like prosecutorial discretion in 
criminal matters, administrative prosecution is a function that “has long 
been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch ….”175
Indeed, while prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised in violation of 
constitutional rights (e.g., in a racially discriminatory manner), it is 
generally subject to standardless discretion.
Other preclusion decisions can be explained in similar terms.  
National security considerations within the President’s foreign relations 
powers were implicated in Webster v. Doe,176 which held that decisions 
of the Directer of the CIA to terminate an employer were not reviewable 
(except for constitutional claims).177 Likewise, Lincoln v. Vigil, which 
under FIFRA to claims of fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation, or 
constitutional error).
173See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984),
174
 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
175 Id. at  832.  
176
 486 U.S. 592 (1988).  
177 Id. at 600-05.
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refused to review a decision by the Indian Health Service not to fund a 
medical facility, can be explained in terms of traditional executive 
prerogatives relating to the allocation of discretionary budget items.178
We do not anticipate that this exception would justify Congress in 
giving the Executive Branch standardless discretion over most 
government benefits.179  Decisions about welfare benefits, licenses, and 
most government jobs do not require that government officials have 
unfettered discretion in order to make the government run more 
effectively.   The exception would come into play, however, concerning 
some forms of government employment, because of the President’s 
unique role for the oversight of executive officials, including the 
appointment and removal of those officials.180  For similar reasons, it 
might also apply to some government contracts and grants.
B. OTHER VIEWS
As noted earlier, although there is an extensive literature on the 
extent to which Congress can foreclose judicial review, we are the first 
to offer a standards-based theory that requires Article III review of the 
initial administrative adjudication of facts and law in government benefit 
claims.  While some other commentators argue that at least some form of 
judicial review is constitutionally compelled, we argue in this part that 
our standards-based approach is preferable to approach taken by these 
other commentators.  
1. PUBLIC RIGHTS
The administrative adjudication literature is for the most part highly 
critical of the public rights doctrine, challenging its historical 
foundations, its conceptual incoherence, and its fundamental 
inconsistency with the rule of law.181  Nevertheless, most of the 
178
 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (“The allocation of funds from a lump-sum 
appropriation is another administrative decision traditionally regarded as 
committed to agency discretion.”).
179 See Shapiro & Levy, supra note  , at 138-39 (discussing this exception to 
standards requirement).
180
 See id. at  140-41 (discussing the political discretion exception as applied 
to public employment).
181 See, e.g., AMAN & MAYTON, supra note __, at 126 (“Because the public 
and private rights distinction . . . allows the courts’ important federal question 
jurisdiction to be allocated to agencies without reference to Article III or its 
purposes, the distinction is surely deficient.”); Fallon, supra note ___, at 953 
(“to the extent that [the public rights doctrine] displaces checks against arbitrary 
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commentary assumes that the doctrine exempts administrative 
adjudication of public rights entirely from Article III,182 and that the 
doctrine would have to be abolished in order to ensure some form of 
judicial review.183  Commentators who favor abolishing the public rights 
doctrine would replace it with the balancing test announced by the Court 
in Schor or some variation of it.  Professor Richard Fallon is the leading 
proponent of this approach.  His “appellate review theory” of judicial 
review posits that “when Congress chooses to employ a non-article III 
federal adjudicator, it must provide for judicial review of at least some 
issues in a constitutional court.”184
and self-interested government action, the doctrine threatens the rule of law”).  
For additional commentary critical of the public rights doctrine, see Paul M. 
Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts 
under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 250 (1990) (“For even if the ‘public rights’ 
category were an intelligible and manageable category (which it is plainly not), 
we still have not been told why the category is congruent with cases where the 
use of an article I court or administrative agency is valid.”); Martin H. Redish,
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline 
Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, at 210 (discussing the constitutional flaws in the 
public-rights doctrine) Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 
56 U. COLO.L.REV. 581, 592-602 (1985) (arguing that the Article III safeguards 
are especially necessary in public rights cases); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights 
and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to 
Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 837 (1986) (criticizing the public-rights doctrine 
from a separation-of-powers perspective); see also Kenneth S. Klein, The 
Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the Historical Rationale of the 
Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 (1994) (arguing against 
the constitutional validity of the public-rights doctrine with respect to the 
Seventh Amendment); Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights 
Doctrine in Light of the Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment 21 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 (1994) (arguing that the history of the Seventh 
Amendment does not support the application of the public rights doctrine).
182 See, e.g. GLEN O. ROBINSON, ERNEST GELLHORN & HAROLD H. BRUFF, 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 163 (4th ed. 1993) (The Supreme Court has 
“approved foreclosure of review of nonconstitutional claims, and the prevailing 
assumption since Crowell has been that judicial review of public right claims is 
not required.) (citation omitted).
183
 Professor Stern is a notable exception.  He reviews Murray’s Lessee and 
notes, as we do, that the facts and reasoning of the case do not address the 
foreclosure of review, but he does not fully explain the public rights doctrine.  
See Craig A. Stern What's a Constitution among Friends?–Unbalancing Article 
III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1062-63 (1998); see also Joshua I. Schwartz 
Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 1815, 1883-85 (1989) (arguing that Murray’s Lessee and Crowell do not 
support foreclosure of judicial review of public rights cases).
184
 Fallon, supra note ___, at 949.  See also Richard B. Saphire & Michael 
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Our understanding of the public rights doctrine causes us to take a 
different route.  As we discussed previously,185 the public rights doctrine 
is best understood as standing for the proposition that extrajudicial 
action to enforce rights belonging to the public is executive action.  
From this perspective, the doctrine permits executive action resembling 
adjudication in the first instance, but says nothing about the foreclosure 
of judicial review.  Thus, we do not see the public rights doctrine as 
incompatible with a general constitutional requirement of judicial review 
of executive action.  The doctrine may therefore continue to play an 
important role in assessing the constitutionality of first instance 
adjudication by agencies (or legislative courts).186
We also reject use of a balancing test to determine when Article III 
review must be employed.  Whether the foreclosure of review is 
consistent with the rule of law, under either a due process or Article III 
approach, can and should be resolved by reference to Marbury’s
understanding of the judicial role in enforcing the rule of law.  Under 
this approach, Article III review is required for all agency adjudications 
in order to preserve the rule of law except where the Constitution 
contemplates that Congress can authorize Executive Action without 
establishing standards for such action.
2. DUE PROCESS 
E. Solimine Shoring up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC 
v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85 (1988) (arguing that judicial review should be 
required under the Schor test).
185 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
186
 In light of the Court’s longstanding recognition of the doctrine and its 
role in preserving the constitutionality of first instance administrative 
adjudication (without juries), we doubt that the Court is prepared to directly 
repudiate it.  In a similar vein, Professor Fallon concludes that the doctrine is too 
well-ensconced to be rejected, but seeks to narrow its scope to render it 
consistent with his appellate review theory of Article III.  See Fallon, supra note 
___, at 953-70.  Although the rule of law does not speak to first instance 
administrative adjudication, provided that sufficient judicial review is retained, 
other Article III considerations, such as preserving the structural balance of the 
three branches, as well as the Seventh Amendment, are implicated by 
administrative adjudication in the first instance.  Whether the public rights 
doctrine is an appropriate component of the analysis of these issues is beyond the 
scope of this article.  For analysis of the Seventh Amendment issues, see 
Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the 
Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 
(1994); Ellen Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh 
Amendment, 77 N.C.L. REV. 1037 (1999).
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Many scholars approach foreclosure of judicial review from a due 
process perspective,187 drawing on the Supreme Court’s cases suggesting 
that preclusion of review may violate due process.188   While preclusion 
of review may violate due process, the due process approach is ill suited
to provide a coherent account of judicial review, which is primarily a 
separation of powers safeguard and is best understood from that 
perspective.189
Under current doctrine, due process only attaches to government 
decisions that deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest.  
When government benefit decisions are involved, this doctrine permits 
Congress to evade due process safeguards by declining to create an 
entitlement.  Thus, linking judicial review to due process would not, 
under current doctrine, prevent Congress from foreclosing review (by 
declining to create an entitlement).190
Even when there is a protected interest, the availability of judicial 
review under current doctrine would appear to be a question of what 
process is due and therefore subject to Matthews v. Eldridge’s
instrumental calculus.191  Thus, judicial review would be available only 
if it could be shown that the benefits of judicial review in terms of 
increased accuracy exceed its costs.  This approach accords no value to 
the systemic interest in preserving the rule of law.
187 See Weinberg, supra note ___ (arguing that due process, not Article III, 
should be the primary referent for considering congressional authority to limit 
the jurisdiction of federal courts); see also Richard Fallon, Some Confusions 
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 309, 332-35 (1993) (analyzing due process right of review).
188 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
189
 To the extent that due process reflects the rule of law generally, judicial 
review and due process are linked.  But we think the constitutional safeguards 
for the rule of law are best understood within the context of the particular 
provisions from which they derive.  Thus, procedural safeguards are best 
analyzed from a due process perspective and judicial review is best analyzed in 
terms of Article III and the separation of powers.
190
 This and other problems with the current approach to due process were 
the focus of our earlier article, which advances the standards-based approach to 
the rule of law as a solution.  See Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___.
191
 For an application of Matthews to the question of judicial review, see 
Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of Federal Benefit 
Disbursement: Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L. REV. 778 (1984) 
(arguing that Matthews prevents complete preclusion of review).
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In the final analysis, absent a comprehensive reformulation of due 
process doctrine, the Due Process Clause does not provide a secure 
foundation for judicial review.192  None of the commentators supporting 
the due process approach to judicial review have offered such a 
reformulation of the doctrine.  More fundamentally, treating judicial 
review as a component of due process diminishes its constitutional role.  
Judicial review is more than a particular procedural safeguard; it is a 
core rule of law requirement.
3. ARTICLE III
In the “huge” body of scholarly comment on the power of Congress 
to restrict federal jurisdiction in light of Article III,193 the only consensus 
is that the issues are unlikely to be resolved definitively in the 
foreseeable future.  Much of the traditional debate has focused on the 
meaning of Article III’s jurisdictional provisions.  While some scholars 
join us in reading the mandatory language of these provisions as 
requiring that the entire judicial power must vest in Article III courts,194
the majority of commentators reject this view.  Nevertheless, most of 
majority recognizes some constraints on congressional authority to limit 
the jurisdiction of federal courts.195
One influential view posits that Congress may not use its 
jurisdictional authority to interfere with the “essential functions” of the 
judiciary.  This approach “essential” asks whether a particular preclusion 
of review “will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the 
constitutional plan”196 or undermine the distribution of authority 
192
 Of course, our standards-based approach to due process might be one 
such comprehensive reformulation and it would eliminate the problem of 
whether due process attaches.  See Shapiro & Levy, supra note ___.  But our 
approach does not challenge the Mathews v. Eldridge, which – with some 
tweaking – we consider to be an acceptable mode of inquiry for determining 
whether particular procedural safeguards are required.  Id. at 141-42.  
193 See Howard P. Fink, Linda S. Mullenix, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Mark V. 
Tushnet, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 181 (1996) (referring to the 
“huge” literature and describing it).  As noted earlier, this is one of the oldest 
and most famous debates regarding the federal courts.  See supra notes ___ and 
accompanying text
194 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
195
 Some commentators, however, do argue that Congress has plenary 
authority to restrict federal jurisdiction.  See Gerald Gunther, Congressional 
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the 
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984).
196
 Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953); 
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between the judiciary and the other branches of government.197  Because 
this approach focuses on broader structural issues, it tends to submerge 
rule of law concerns and does not fully account for the individual 
interest in governmental regularity. 
Many scholars, for example, assume that the essential functions 
approach does not require judicial review of statutory, as opposed to 
constitutional, claims.  It remains unclear, however, why there is any less 
need for judicial review when statutory rights are involved.  The 
concerns about rule of law are the same in both cases. 198  To the extent 
some commentators use essential functions analysis to argue for a broad 
requirement of judicial review in every case,199 we think the standards-
based rule of law approach provides a superior conceptual framework 
because it explains why judicial review is an “essential” function. 
Even among scholars who would require review of statutory 
interpretation and other legal issues, there is a split of opinion 
concerning whether some judicial review of fact-finding is also 
necessary.200  This difference of opinion tends to derive from the 
structural separation of powers perspective of those who advocate 
mandatory review.  Limiting judicial review of fact-finding in a narrow 
group of statutory cases would not necessarily unbalance the three 
branches of government by interfering with the essential functions of the 
Ratner, supra note ___ (arguing that the essential functions approach precludes 
Congress from negating the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over any 
given subject on the ground that it would prevent the Court from its essential 
function of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law).
197
 Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, __ (1984).
198 See Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of “Congress” to 
Attack the “Jurisdiction” of “Federal Courts”, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1424 
(2000) (“[T]here is no good reason why a claimant with a merely statutory claim 
against a federal official should have less access to an apolitical forum than a 
claimant with a constitutional claim.”)
199
 The leading exponent of this “appellate review theory” is Richard Fallon.  
See Fallon, supra note ___ and accompanying text.
200 Compare Saphire & Solimine, supra note __, at 139 (requiring judicial 
review of both factual and legal determinations) with Fallon, supra note __, at 
987 (requiring judicial review only of legal issues and establishing a 
presumption against judicial review of factual issues) and Paul M. Bator, The 
Constitution As Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under 
Article III, 65 IND. L. REV. 233, 267-28 (1990) (requiring judicial review of 
legal issues, but not of factual issues as long as agency procedures comport with 
due process).
52 STANDARDS-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW
judiciary or unduly trammeling on the constitutional authority of the 
federal courts.  
We disagree that Congress can preclude judicial review of fact-
finding by the Executive Branch.  Our disagreement arises from two 
points made earlier.  First, unconstrained discretion over the factual 
determinations that provide the predicate for lawful government action 
can defeat the rule of law.201  Second, appellate review in the Executive 
Branch is insufficient to protect the rule of law.202  We therefore 
conclude the rule of law requires at least some judicial review of 
administrative factual determinations and of the application of law to 
facts.  This conclusion is supported by our reading of the text of Article 
III, which specifically refers to the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction as extending to “Law and Fact.”203
C. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
  The debate about judicial preclusion is longstanding and extensive 
with federal courts scholars, in particular, taking a range of positions.  
This debate, however, has mostly ignored the rule of law considerations 
that we regard as of the utmost constitutional significance.  We believe 
the rule of law is significant not only as a matter of constitutional 
principle, but for practical reasons as well.  Along with procedural due 
process, judicial review is an essential safeguard against errors and 
abuse by government officials.  
While some observers are skeptical of the value of judicial review 
and assume that the costs of judicial intervention in administrative 
decisions outweigh its benefits,204 our understanding is different.   
Judicial review of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in the 1980s 
demonstrates the important role that judicial review plays in preserving 
the rule of law.  More recent experience with the Veterans 
Administration (VA) suggests the independence of Article III judges is a 
crucial element of that role.
After the election of President Ronald Reagan, SSA adopted a series 
of highly restrictive policies and practices that resulted in sharply 
201 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
202 See supra notes __ & accompanying text. 
203 U.S. CONST.,  Art. III. §  2, cl. 2.
204 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996).
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increased rates of denial or termination of benefits.205  While some of 
these policies and practices and resulting denials and terminations were 
legitimate responses to concerns about abuse of the system, the SSA 
itself admitted that it wrongfully terminated benefits to hundreds of 
thousands claimants.206  Moreover, the courts found that many of the 
SSA’s policies and practices were contrary to applicable statutory 
standards and in some instances flagrantly so.207  Although the SSA 
often resisted these judicial decisions through a formal policy of 
“nonacquiescence”208 and used unpublished policies and bureaucratic 
practices to influence nominally independent administrative 
decisionmakers,209 it was eventually forced to abandon or modify most 
of its restrictive practices.210
Most observers agree that judicial review was an essential safeguard 
for the rule of law in the administration of Social Security benefits.211
205 See Susan Gluck Mezey, No Longer Disabled: The Federal Courts and 
the Politics of the Social Security Administration (1988); Debra Cofer, Judges, 
Bureaucrats and the Question of Independence: A Study of the Social Security 
Administration Hearing Process (1985); Richard E. Levy, Social Security 
Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
461 (Report prepared for the Federal Courts Study Committee).
206 See Schweicker v. Chilicky 487 U.S. 412, 416 (1988).
207 See, e.g., City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983) (finding that SSA had employed an illegal and clandestine policy of 
presuming that claimants who did not meet regulations defining per se disabling 
ailments disabilities could perform unskilled work without regard to individual 
circumstances of claimants), aff’d ,  742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’d sub nom.
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986); see also Mental Health Ass’n 
v. Schweicker, 554 F. Supp. 157 (D.Minn. 1982) (same), aff’d sub nom. Mental 
Health Ass’n v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983).
208
 Under the nonacquiescence policy, the SSA would issue rulings 
specifically directing administrative decisionmakers to apply regulations or 
policies that had been invalidated by federal courts of appeals, even in the 
circuits where the decisions were rendered.  See Levy, supra note ___, at 503-07
209
 For example, under the “Bellmon Review Program” the SSA targeted 
administrative law judges with high rates of allowing benefits for review on the 
agency’s own motion.  Id. at 497-99.  Other practices are described at id. 484-
506.
210 See, e.g., id. at 485 & n. 126 (citing authorities)
211
 Examples include the authorities cited supra note ___.  One notable 
exception is Professor Richard Pierce, who has argued that the judiciary 
overstepped its bounds in the area of Social Security. See Richard Pierce, 
Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: 
Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 501-515 (1990). 
Professor Pierce’s opposition to judicial review is longstanding and consistent, 
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Certainly, administrative appeals within SSA did not provide sufficient 
protection and indeed were part of the problem.  It is possible that an 
Article I court would have had greater independence and therefore 
provided adequate protection for beneficiaries, but experience with the 
VA suggests that Article I courts are not always sufficiently independent 
of the agencies they review.
Prior to 1989, Congress precluded any Article III review of VA 
disability decisions. In 1989, Congress responded to longstanding and 
nearly unanimous complaints by veterans associations about the lack of 
fair and responsive adjudication by the VA by adopting the Veterans 
Judicial Review Act.212  The Act established what is now known as the 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), an Article I court, to 
review the factual and legal conclusions of the VA.213  The CAVC’s 
decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, which has Article III status, but this review does not 
include factual determinations or the application of statutes or 
regulations to the facts of a particular case.214
The VA disability adjudication system, however, continues to be 
highly dysfunctional.215  The VA has over 600,000 pending claims,216
and the agency takes an average of two and one-half to three years to 
but we respectfully submit that it is also wrong. 
212 See Lawernce B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the 
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: The VA Is Brought Kicking and Screaming Into 
the World of Meaningful Due Process, 46 Me. L. Rev. 43, 44-45 (1994) 
(describing the events leading to the passage of the Veterans Judicial Review 
Act).
213 See Veterans Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 
(1989) (defining organization, jurisdiction, procedure and other provisions of the 
new court).   Congress also authorized the Federal Circuit to engage in limited 
review of CAVC decisions.  See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1) (establishing 
jurisdiction to review CAVC decisions only on its interpretation of governing 
statutes).  
214 See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (expressly precluding such issues from the 
scope of Federal Circuit review).  This exclusion does not apply to constitutional 
claims, however.  Id.
215
 For general discussion, see Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable 
and Social Insurance Models in the Veteran’s Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & 
POL’Y 303 (2004) (arguing that retention of a charitable model – of which 
limited review is a component – for the administration of a social insurance 
program contributes to the difficulties experienced by the VA).
216
 VA Claims Processing Task Force, Report to the Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs, at 9 (Oct. 2001).  In 1992, the VA had 531,078 pending claims, while 
the number was 342,683 claims in 1996.  Id.
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process a claim.217  Moreover, over the last seven years, CAVC has 
remanded nearly 70 percent of the appeals it has heard,218 and the VA 
takes nearly five times as long to process a remand as an original 
claim.219
Professor James O’Reilly argues the CAVC’s Article I status has 
contributed to the VA’s failure to reform itself because the court lacks 
sufficient independence from the VA.220  According to Professor 
O’Reilly, “[T]he reading of dozens of CAVC decisions convinces the 
reader that the CAVC does not exhibit the will to compel the VA to 
deliver timely and accurate service to those who present claims before 
the CAVC.  The CAVC itself seems captive of a dysfunctional 
system.”221  He compares the more favorable record of Article III review 
of social security cases, discussed previously, and recommends that 
Congress abolish the CAVC and adopt the Social Security appeals 
model for VA.222
We do not wish to overstate the differences between Social Security 
and Veterans benefits.  Judicial review has not prevented controversies 
surrounding the Social Security benefit decisions and many claimant 
advocates remain dissatisfied with the system.  Moreover, problems at 
the VA are attributable to a variety of factors, including inadequate 
funding and personnel and inherent difficulties in processing claims.223
Nevertheless, we concur with Professor O’Reilly that the CAVC’s 
Article I status has contributed to the failure of reform.
It is extraordinary that the CAVC has remanded 70 percent of the 
disability appeals it has heard.  This record may simply reflect the VA’s 
inability to get it right the first time.  An examination of these appeals, 
217 Id. at ___.  The VA can take as long as seven years to resolve a claim.  
Id.
218See United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Annual Reports 
(available at www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/AboutCourt/AnnualReport.asp).
219
 As of July 2001, the regional offices took at average of 184.2 days to 
render a decision on an initial claim and an average of 672 days to process a 
remand from the CAVC or the BVA.   This delay has increased since 1995 when 
the processing time for a remand was 561 days.  VA Claims Processing Task 
Force, supra note __, at __.
220
 O’Reilly, supra note __, at 228; but see Gary O’ Connor, Rendering to 
Caesar: A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 343 (2001) 
(disputing Professor O’Reilly’s conclusions).
221 Id. at __.  
222 Id. at 224, 255
223 See, e.g., Levy, supra note ___, at 323.
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however, also indicates that the CAVC has exhibited excessive tolerance 
for VA delay and ineptitude by failing to interpret its powers and the 
VA’s mandate in ways that could speed decisionmaking and improve its 
accuracy.224  The CAVC’s failure to act forcefully may be the product of 
any number of causes.  When we compare the court’s failure to act with 
the strong and persistent effort of Article III judges to hold SSA 
accountable in the 1980s, however, we are left with the firm impression 
that the court’s Article I status is a key factor.
The experience with the VA suggests to us the independence of 
Article III judges can be an important element in establishing meaningful 
and effective judicial review.  The experience with the VA also suggests 
to us the practical consequences of denying meaningful and independent 
review.  In light of the delays at the VA, it is not at all unusual for a 
veteran to die before his or her meritorious disability claim is 
resolved.225
CONCLUSION
The rule of law is central our constitutional order.  Its protections 
should apply broadly to government action, including the allocation of 
government benefits.  Under current doctrine, however, that is not 
always the case, particularly when it comes to government benefits.  
Instead, the application of essential rule of law safeguards, including 
judicial review, is a matter of legislative grace.
In this article, we have attempted to clear away the doctrinal morass 
that complicates this important area of the law.  We have demonstrated 
that the public rights doctrine should have no bearing on the necessity of 
judicial review.  We have shown that the due process and Article III 
224 See Levy, supra note ___, at 321-22 (discussing failure of the CAVC to 
scrutinize VA benefit decisions carefully notwithstanding recent legislation 
designed to encourage a more aggressive posture); James T. O’Reilly, Burying 
Ceaser: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed to Provide 
Fairness to Claimants, 53 Ad. L. Rev. 223 (2001) (explaining ways the CAVC 
could have, but has not, improved VA decisionmaking); Bill Russo, Ten Years 
After the Battle for Veterens Judicial Review: An Assessment, Fed. Law., June, 
1999, at 29 (same); [check this]); Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Practice, American Bar Association, Report and Recommendation (date?) 
(same).
225
 Many claims are made by elderly World War II or Korean veterans in the 
last few years prior to their deaths.  Robin J. Arzt, What Veterans Would Gain 
From Administrative Procedure Act Adjudications, TOMMY: A LAWYERS GUIDE 
TO VETERANS AFFAIRS, Issue 2, 2002, at 1.
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jurisprudence on the foreclosure of judicial review fails to resolve the 
critical issue of whether Congress can foreclose nonconstitutional 
review of agency action, and it offers no coherent explanation of how 
the foreclosure of judicial review can be reconciled with the rule of law.  
And we have presented our alternative – a standards-based approach to 
judicial review.
The standards-based approach offers a coherent account not only of 
judicial review, but also of due process (as we have argued in a 
companion article to this one).  It is therefore a much more promising 
approach to the rule of law than either current doctrine or the
alternatives that have been suggested in the literature.  
